In The Valley Of The Shadow Of History
Saturday, June 30th, 2007The modus operandi of any guerrilla movement is to operate within the civilian population so that those conventional forces that they are combating will think before violently acting, placing them in an ethically compromised position. In times past, the only way to combat such tactics was to openly declare that no difference existed between the two and that both would be treated with equal impunity. Civilian support networks are the backbone of guerrilla movements, which, for the most part, cannot operate successfully without them. That said, and given that reality, the commonly employed tactic of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is exposed for the pointless exercise that it is, especially with regards to major US military actions in the later half of the 20th Century and the first seven years of this one.
The greatest advantage that the United States possesses when initially militarily involving itself in a foreign country is, in my opinion, the perception of that country’s population with regards to what America itself supposedly stands for. Of course, there are those that are not entirely without first hand experience with regards to American complicity, but is an interesting phenomenon that it usually isn’t until after they’ve significantly involved themselves that public perception is often changed for the worse. And that is something that should certainly not be overlooked with regards to Iraq or Afghanistan.
Obviously, this does not apply to the Second World War, though it could be said that the Japanese population was so demoralized after the obliteration of their country that their national trauma prevented them from doing anything but embracing the presence of the Americans, who would forever change the face of that nation. But it certainly does apply to US involvement in South East Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.
All of this leads to an interesting question. When guerrillas constitute the primary enemy in a conflict, how do we view their tactics? There’s no question that military commanders are going to immediately condemn them as cowards and claim that were they at all honourable they would come out into the open and fight. And, of course, what Western military commander wouldn’t say that given that they have far superior conventional weapons at their disposal, not to mention air and naval forces that their enemies don’t possess. The reality is that guerrillas are guerrillas precisely because they lack the ability to meet their opponents squarely in a conventional sense. What fool, given such circumstances, would? The Vietnamese didn’t, and after ten years, and over 50,000 US deaths, it became clear that there wasn’t a military solution left the United States short of employing nuclear weapons. They had, of course, dropped more bombs on North Vietnam, parts of Cambodia – primarily the Ho Chi Minh Trail - than had been dropped in World War Two, and it had not stopped the Vietcong. In fact, it didn’t stop the regular North Vietnamese Army either.
Like the Americans in Vietnam, the Soviets learned the hard way in Afghanistan in the 80’s that a considerable conventional advantage was no match against those willing to surrender their lives for their beliefs, an irony considering the immense sacrifices of the Soviets during the Second World War. The same rule applied in Vietnam as well. This, in no small way, also has a significant impact on those fighting guerrillas who, unlike them, are dedicated enough, for the most part, to their beliefs and cause to stand up and take death without the burden of questions such as ‘why am I doing this?’ or ‘why am I here?’ spinning around in their heads. The truth is that no tank built, nor bomber designed, can combat that sort of dedication. And that is precisely why the arrogance of vastly militarized nations lands them in trouble in such situations – because they believe that the combination of transparent goodwill and the employment of overwhelming conventional force will somehow sway those opposing them that their cause is futile.
What has transpired in Iraq since 2003, and in Afghanistan since late 2001, is no exception to this rule. Call them what you will, be it ‘terrorists’ or ‘freedom fighters’, the tactics of those that have opposed the occupations of both countries have been incredibly effective, and yet that success and determination is not cast the operations of those currently occupying either country as ineffective, only slightly misguided. The solution to the problem has been, as it has in the past, to throw more money, men, and materials at the problem while refusing to contemplate the historical realities of past failures. In 1967 many Americans did not believe that US efforts in Vietnam should be abandoned, and that to abandon them would lead to disaster. But in 1975, the United States, after 10 years of war, did just that, it left Vietnam.
The Soviets were forced to do the exact same thing with regards to Afghanistan.
While many American combat troops in Iraq wonder why they’re there, George Bush has no intention of abandoning the disaster that he created, nor the entirely unrealistic ‘show of democracy’ that has been created and supplanted behind the fortress walls of the Green Zone. And while Iraq continues to be gripped by turmoil, and the complexities of the situation are amplified, one wonders why there aren’t more pressing discussions occurring with regards to the fact that the Iraqi adventure, like Vietnam, is one that will ultimately end in the United States simply leaving, no matter their investment in the country at present, no matter their commitments to private interests promised lucrative rights, no matter the intentions of this administration. The fact remains that the majority of Iraqis don’t want them there, and that is something that, given enough time, may only renew or amplify public support for anti-occupational guerrilla groups.
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