In The Valley Of The Shadow Of History
The modus operandi of any guerrilla movement is to operate within the civilian population so that those conventional forces that they are combating will think before violently acting, placing them in an ethically compromised position. In times past, the only way to combat such tactics was to openly declare that no difference existed between the two and that both would be treated with equal impunity. Civilian support networks are the backbone of guerrilla movements, which, for the most part, cannot operate successfully without them. That said, and given that reality, the commonly employed tactic of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is exposed for the pointless exercise that it is, especially with regards to major US military actions in the later half of the 20th Century and the first seven years of this one.
The greatest advantage that the United States possesses when initially militarily involving itself in a foreign country is, in my opinion, the perception of that country’s population with regards to what America itself supposedly stands for. Of course, there are those that are not entirely without first hand experience with regards to American complicity, but is an interesting phenomenon that it usually isn’t until after they’ve significantly involved themselves that public perception is often changed for the worse. And that is something that should certainly not be overlooked with regards to Iraq or Afghanistan.
Obviously, this does not apply to the Second World War, though it could be said that the Japanese population was so demoralized after the obliteration of their country that their national trauma prevented them from doing anything but embracing the presence of the Americans, who would forever change the face of that nation. But it certainly does apply to US involvement in South East Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.
All of this leads to an interesting question. When guerrillas constitute the primary enemy in a conflict, how do we view their tactics? There’s no question that military commanders are going to immediately condemn them as cowards and claim that were they at all honourable they would come out into the open and fight. And, of course, what Western military commander wouldn’t say that given that they have far superior conventional weapons at their disposal, not to mention air and naval forces that their enemies don’t possess. The reality is that guerrillas are guerrillas precisely because they lack the ability to meet their opponents squarely in a conventional sense. What fool, given such circumstances, would? The Vietnamese didn’t, and after ten years, and over 50,000 US deaths, it became clear that there wasn’t a military solution left the United States short of employing nuclear weapons. They had, of course, dropped more bombs on North Vietnam, parts of Cambodia – primarily the Ho Chi Minh Trail - than had been dropped in World War Two, and it had not stopped the Vietcong. In fact, it didn’t stop the regular North Vietnamese Army either.
Like the Americans in Vietnam, the Soviets learned the hard way in Afghanistan in the 80’s that a considerable conventional advantage was no match against those willing to surrender their lives for their beliefs, an irony considering the immense sacrifices of the Soviets during the Second World War. The same rule applied in Vietnam as well. This, in no small way, also has a significant impact on those fighting guerrillas who, unlike them, are dedicated enough, for the most part, to their beliefs and cause to stand up and take death without the burden of questions such as ‘why am I doing this?’ or ‘why am I here?’ spinning around in their heads. The truth is that no tank built, nor bomber designed, can combat that sort of dedication. And that is precisely why the arrogance of vastly militarized nations lands them in trouble in such situations – because they believe that the combination of transparent goodwill and the employment of overwhelming conventional force will somehow sway those opposing them that their cause is futile.
What has transpired in Iraq since 2003, and in Afghanistan since late 2001, is no exception to this rule. Call them what you will, be it ‘terrorists’ or ‘freedom fighters’, the tactics of those that have opposed the occupations of both countries have been incredibly effective, and yet that success and determination is not cast the operations of those currently occupying either country as ineffective, only slightly misguided. The solution to the problem has been, as it has in the past, to throw more money, men, and materials at the problem while refusing to contemplate the historical realities of past failures. In 1967 many Americans did not believe that US efforts in Vietnam should be abandoned, and that to abandon them would lead to disaster. But in 1975, the United States, after 10 years of war, did just that, it left Vietnam.
The Soviets were forced to do the exact same thing with regards to Afghanistan.
While many American combat troops in Iraq wonder why they’re there, George Bush has no intention of abandoning the disaster that he created, nor the entirely unrealistic ‘show of democracy’ that has been created and supplanted behind the fortress walls of the Green Zone. And while Iraq continues to be gripped by turmoil, and the complexities of the situation are amplified, one wonders why there aren’t more pressing discussions occurring with regards to the fact that the Iraqi adventure, like Vietnam, is one that will ultimately end in the United States simply leaving, no matter their investment in the country at present, no matter their commitments to private interests promised lucrative rights, no matter the intentions of this administration. The fact remains that the majority of Iraqis don’t want them there, and that is something that, given enough time, may only renew or amplify public support for anti-occupational guerrilla groups.
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June 30th, 2007 at 5:05 pm
I’m curious how you reconcile these two facts:
1) “Civilian support networks are the backbone of guerrilla movements”
2) “the commonly employed tactic of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is exposed for the pointless exercise that it is”
with your condemnation of civilian deaths in Iraq.
In fact, your entire post seems to beg the question: If, “in times past, the only way to combat such tactics was to openly declare that no difference existed between the two”, then what is the winning stratagem now?
Clearly we can push for the US to leave Iraq, but regardless, the effectiveness of guerrilla attacks against conventional forces has been bolstered here, yet again, by a categorical unwillingness on the part of Western society to “do whatever is necessary to win” in the face of those who will.
Do we simply lay down and admit that our commitment to “human rights” in war hands a winning stratagem to the enemy, and never again face any enemy using that tactic? If so, every enemy of peace will soon adopt it.
Or do we change our seemingly unwavering commitment to handing rights to the enemy that prevent us from ever winning against them?
June 30th, 2007 at 5:25 pm
“Was the invasion of Iraq about human rights? And are you suggesting that the Iraqi people are uncapable of making them a prominent issue in the future?”
No, and no. But let’s treat Iraq, for a second (and though it isn’t), as a completely justified, defensive action against a hostile guerrilla force.
Given the present situation, how would we win?
Obviously civilian deaths would be mitigated if the US were to leave Iraq, but that’s just an interesting aside to my main point:
What we are seeing here is the coming-of-age of a tactic, asymmetrical warfare, that combined with our lack of resolve to “do whatever is necessary”, makes for a very grim future for Western nations when they meet real, serious hostile threats of this type. There is a very fine line between domestic terrorism and a guerrilla insurgency, and it’s only one of organization and scale.
Western nations could soon face similar threats not in the foreign nations they occupy, but within their borders, guerrilla terrorism campaigns bordering on insurgencies. And what are they to do about them if we insist so thoroughly, as we do now, on trying to segregate such a guerrilla force from its civilian support network? In practice, they are indistinguishable. The guerrilla force exists at the will of that civilian population and is inseparably attached to it.
Unfortunately I find myself asking once again, when simply withdrawing from the occupied foreign nation hosting the threat is not an option, is there any way to dismantle a guerrilla insurgency that doesn’t also necessitate a dismantling of its civilian support network?
Targeting civilians, as we are all well aware, is directly contrary to the international conventions of warfare. Yet it seems the only proven way, thus far, to counter such an insurgency is to disregard these conventions and, in your own words, “to openly declare that no difference [exists] between the two”.
June 30th, 2007 at 6:17 pm
“Targeting civilians, as we are all well aware, is directly contrary to the international conventions of warfare. Yet it seems the only proven way, thus far, to counter such an insurgency is to disregard these conventions”.
I am not aware of a situation in which this was proven effective but what I can provide is an example of a time where the targeting of civilians worked in the opposite way in which it was intended. South Vietnam under Diem directly led to conditions that allowed for the creation of the National Liberation Front (NLF) which were the main guerilla force in the country. Diem knew that the NLF was effectively recruiting the majority peasant population either through examples (however skewed) of positive economic conditions in North Vietnam or through examples of Diem’s excesses. These excesses included forcing entire villages into “strategic hamlets” where they were removed from their traditional lands which had traditionally been occupied for countless generations, often predating the 12th century Chinese invasion. This shows a complete absence of differentiation by the Diem government between active insurgents and passive peasants. By 1958 after four years in power Diem had imprisoned 40,000 people, by 1961 there were 150,000 and ordered the execution of 12,000 people. These deaths and imprisonments provide an example of what it means to ignore the conventions of warfare and the results of these actions represent an example of what has consistently happened throughout history when this is done.
The purpose of my writing this is not to compare Vietnam to Iraq as that is far too much of a simplification but rather to provide a clear example of how treating civilians as military targets has worked in the past. It should also be noted that the American government did not endorse these actions and there is some debate as to whether or not they even knew of them. My personal stance is that they were unaware of much of what Diem was doing in terms of specifics but would likely not have opposed it on moral grounds, only on the grounds that it was, to put it mildly, making Diem politically unpopular.
For anyone interested in either checking these facts or reading more about the lead up to the War in Vietnam I would reccommend Gabriel Kolko’s “Anatomy of a War” and Seth Jacobs “Cold War Mandarin”
June 30th, 2007 at 6:28 pm
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The point is that national security relies more on NOT involving oneself in foreign entanglements than it does involving yourself. George Washington warned as much over 200 years ago, and he was right. Unfortunately, the United States has involved itself all over the world, and in ways that most have no real knowledge of, ones that have resulted in their complicity producing results that eventually reached their shores.
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As Matt hinted, this goes all the way back before there WAS a United States to take these actions. During the US Revolution, Britain faced forces both for and against the independence of the colonies, and they had to make the force to treat them all together as one. So must we do the same in Iraq, with completely different intentions?
I just hate the fact that a nation based on so many ideas and principles over 200 years ago has done nothing but piss and shit on those principles with an exponential rate. It’s like every step we take forward we take another 6 back. If the first Gulf war wasn’t bad enough… look, now we’re all the way back 30 some years and stuck in a Vietnam-esque situation.
It’s a mess, that’s all I can say, and I hope my words didn’t come out the same… as tends to happen.
July 1st, 2007 at 7:02 am
[...] They had, of course, dropped more bombs on North Vietnam, parts of Cambodia – primarily the Ho Chi Minh Trail - than had been dropped in World War Two, and it had not stopped the Vietcong. In fact, it didn’t stop the regular North … …more [...]