The Anbar Payoff

It wasn’t too long ago that unnamed US officials in Iraq were claiming that the Iranians were “forging ties’ with Sunni insurgents in Iraq, some linked with Salafi Jihadi guerrillas. On May 22nd, the Guardian ran a piece entitled Iran’s Secret Plan For Summer Offensive To Force US Out Of Iraq, which claimed…

“…US commanders were bracing for a nationwide, Iranian-orchestrated summer offensive, linking al-Qaida and Sunni insurgents to Tehran’s Shia militia allies, that Iran hoped would trigger a political mutiny in Washington and a US retreat.”

In the weeks that followed, reports began to surface of US efforts to supply aid to Sunni insurgent groups willing to help fight Salafi Jihadi guerrillas that were, mere months ago, if not less, responsible for attacks on US personnel. The initiative, which has drawn sharp criticism from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government, who believes that it is undermining its ability to secure a central authority in the country, aims to supply Sunni groups with arms and money in exchange for their cooperation in aiding US forces in combating Salafi Jihadi in al-Anbar province. It is believed that tens of millions of dollars have already been given to a coalition of tribes known as the ‘Anbar Salvation Council’ which is intended to pay Sunni fighters to cooperate in the initiative. Ironically, there have already been rumours circulating that one of the lead members of the Council has fled with a portion of the money, though they have not been officially substantiated, nor would they be, in my opinion, given that oversight regarding the payment of such monies to groups such as the Anbar Salvation Council is most likely non-existent.

This is, no doubt, a slippery slope given that the ability of such groups to play both sides is a very real possibility. It is, as far as the Americans are concerned, a considerable gamble, and one perhaps more dedicated to placating domestic pressures as to the progress being made, be it real or not, with regards to the ever increasing troop surge in Iraq, which has brought the number of US combat personnel in the country to 156,000. One need only examine the headlines each morning to see that US military commanders continue to warn of a prolonged presence in the country, and that Iraqi government forces are, by no means, ready to assume full responsibility for the nation’s security.

With regards to what has become known as the ‘Anbar Model’, today’s Christian Science Monitor offers some interesting insight…

“A suicide bomber’s attack on an upscale Baghdad hotel Monday was a blow struck against the US plan to support and arm Sunni tribes in western Iraq.

The bomber walked up to a group of Sunni sheikhs and detonated his explosives belt. Among the 12 people killed were four senior tribal members linked to an American effort to combat Al Qaeda in Anbar Province.

The US military says that its strategy of building ties with the tribes has been effective in reducing attacks. But the approach is facing growing criticism from both Iraqi politicians and military experts. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has complained that the initiative is creating militias outside its control and undermining his plan to strengthen the central government’s control over security forces.

“This may result in a temporary ally to help against Al Qaeda, but we are also creating more and better-armed militias, and we are working against what we have said is our principal reason for being [in Iraq,] which is to create and build up a strong central Iraqi government with a monopoly on handling the country’s security,” says Bruce Riedel, a career-long expert in the Middle East and counterterrorism with the Central Intelligence Agency and other federal agencies.

“This is a strategy fraught with risks,” he says.

Some US military officers are questioning the wisdom of the strategy of working with the coalition of tribes known as the Anbar Salvation Council. Some officers in Iraq have noted they are now working with tribes whose members just a few months ago made up a large slice of the Iraqis they were arresting for attacks on US forces and other crimes.

But supporters say the strategy recognizes the reality of the tribes’ powerful role in Iraqi society. Tribal sheikhs, or leaders, have already provided valuable intelligence about Al Qaeda operations and members in their areas. The tribes are anxious to change sides, they say, because Al Qaeda has used mass-casualty tactics like car bombings that the tribes find anathema.

US reliance on tribes is also supported by others who have already written off the possibility of seeing a strong central Iraqi government emerge.”

One wonders what this stratagem will produce. Without the ability to coordinate command of those being paid to assist US forces, the inability to properly account for where the assistance being given is going is troublesome to say the least. While reports claim that numerous Sunni groups are anxious to use this opportunity with regards to amnesty and a greater presence in the Iraqi federal infrastructure, it is somewhat difficult to believe that the majority would be willing to so freely alter their allegiance and abandon their views with regards to the foreign occupation of their country. It is, of course, possible, that they view this as an alternative route to the removal of foreign influences, but then again, only time will tell.

The events of this summer will be interesting only in so much as the political aspects of this initiative are concerned. The human price that will be paid because of it is another matter altogether.