Historical resentment has its drawbacks, especially when you’re militarily occupying a country. In the case of Iraq, its Shia majority has been under the thumb of Sunni minority governments since the British installed Faisal as king in 1923. During the tenure of Saddam Hussein they were persecuted, as were the Kurds, and following the Gulf War were left hung out to dry by the international coalition when they attempted to stand against Hussein’s regime.

When US forces entered Iraq in 2003, the Shia were the least of their concerns. At the time, the Iraqi army was controlled by Ba’athists, who, following the invasion, primarily melted into the countryside where they would help form what would later become the insurgency. What remained of the Iraqi army was, of course, disbanded by Paul Bremmer, easily the biggest mistake made by the United States post-invasion.

The reconstitution of the Iraqi military was thusly something that became a priority, and little consideration was given historic grudges with regards to who would ultimately constitute the majority of its ranks. With the rise of the Sunni insurgency, and the US need to expediently train an Iraqi military and national police force to help bolster security, many that joined the new Iraqi military establishment were not ignorant to the fact that it was a mechanism with which to confront past injustices and seize control of the establishment itself (re: in November of 2005, a secret underground prison was discovered in Baghdad where local police had interned and tortured Sunni captives).

Given the state of civil war that now exists in Iraq, the power wielded by Shia influences within the military establishment has played a significant role in countering US efforts to establish a uniform national security platform. The fact that a great deal of Baghdad has been successfully secured by Shia militias points to this reality. And there is certainly proof that it is becoming an ever increasing problem…

“As the Americans patrol the Sunni Arab neighborhood of Azamiyah, people keep turning to them for help. One man asks them to bring in a fuel truck stopped by Iraqi troops. Another complains that Iraqi soldiers just beat up his brother.

The Americans used to be loathed in Azamiyah, a longtime stronghold of insurgents and the last place where Saddam Hussein appeared in public. Now the animosity has given way to a grudging acceptance, because the people of this northern neighborhood want American protection from a foe they hate and fear even more: the mainly Shiite Iraqi army.

“We feel safe when the Americans are around,” says a computer engineer who gave his name only as Abu Fahd. He stopped going to work because of his fear of militiamen at the Shiite-dominated Health Ministry and now makes a living selling clothes.

“When we see the Iraqi army, we just stay home or close our shops.”

The story of Azamiyah, once a favorite with wealthy Sunnis and nationalists, shows once again how difficult it is to measure the success of the latest surge of American troops amid the shifting allegiances in Baghdad.

The accommodation between Azamiyah and the Americans represents a major breakthrough for the U.S. military, which had long considered the neighborhood among the city’s most dangerous. Yet the success is largely due to a sectarian divide so deep that it has poisoned institutions such as the Iraqi army, jeopardizing the chances of reconciliation and leaving the Americans caught in the middle.”

Be it the military establishment or the government itself, the numbers simply do not lie. It is impossible for a nation that is primarily composed of a group that has been historically misused to simply put the past behind it. The bizarre reality of Iraq’s future is that we may very well see US forces protecting a minority that has, up until this point, constituted their primary military opposition. It should therefore come as a surprise to no one that Sunni militias have agreed these past months to aid US efforts in exchange for arms and money, not to mention the ability to police their own enclaves.