It’s nice to see someone actually use the word ‘bribe’ for a change…

“American forces are paying Sunni insurgents hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash to switch sides and help them to defeat Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

The tactic has boosted the efforts of American forces to restore some order to war-torn provinces around Baghdad in the run-up to a report by General David Petraeus, the US commander, to Congress tomorrow.

Petraeus will tell Congress that there has been great progress at a local level in Iraq following a surge in the number of troops this year, but little sign of political reconciliation.

In a letter to US troops, the general wrote that “local Iraqi leaders are coming forward, opposing extremists and establishing provisional units of neighbourhood security volunteers”.

The Sunday Times has witnessed at first hand the enormous sums of cash changing hands. One sheikh in a town south of Baghdad was given $38,000 (£19,000) and promised a further $189,000 over three months to drive Al-Qaeda fighters from a nearby camp.”

As has been stated previously on this website, it should not be overlooked that the recipients of this money were, mere months ago, attacking US forces. It should also not be overlooked that by simply paying off militias to do your dirty work in hopes of creating inroads to better placate the position of the administration is not success, but rather a very dangerous undertaking that has the potential to backfire.

Not only have such groups received money, but they have also received arms as well. And while the appearance of oversight is projected with regards to their conduct, that is hardly the case.

In plain language, the United States is now paying off elements of the insurgency to help combat a threat that was never as significant as the insurgency itself. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, whose significance has been massively exaggerated, has only ever represented a small percentage of the insurgency itself, a fact that is well documented. To claim that it is a greater threat to Iraqi security than sectarian violence is one that is entirely politicized, primarily for the sake of a continued US military presence in the country. As many experts have observed over the last few years, were the United States to abandon Iraq, Salafi Jihadi groups would most likely be the first on the chopping bloc. Further to that, and despite claims to the contrary by the administration, assertions that they possess the ability to actually seize control of the nation itself are utterly absurd and entirely baseless.

So what will paying off Sunni militant factions accomplish? While the term ‘reconciliation’ is employed, the truth is that it’s most likely a move to help combat the influence that Shia factions have within Iraq’s Interior Ministry and National Police Force. In fact, in a report by the Independent Commission on Security Forces in Iraq, it was suggested that it be ‘disbanded and reorganized’ altogether. So where does “establishing provisional units of neighbourhood security volunteers” come into play? Well, despite the evocation of al-Qaeda, it will allow local Sunni militias to assert their own brand of local justice, helping secure predominantly Sunni enclaves, thus placating their inhabitants.

So is this a measure meant entirely to help combat Salafi Jihadi groups? Or one that has a deeper purpose – the creation of vigilante Sunni militias that can exert control over those areas in which Sunni populations have been disenfranchised? And if that is the case, how successful with the United States be in keeping them in line? After all, these are the very same groups that have fought occupational forces for the last four and a half years. Is it unreasonable to think that they might be playing a game of their own?

Now, some might claim the move brilliant in that it might go a long way towards creating an atmosphere of reconciliation between occupational forces and Sunni insurgents. Then again, is it prudent to believe that for a fist full of dollars they will entirely abandon their beliefs? Is their not room to consider the possibility that they view this opportunity as a way to make inroads with regards to destabilizing the power of the largely Shia controlled government and that that is something that those now paying them off have also considered given their disdain for what they view as the ineffectuality of Iraq’s current government? And if that is the case, what deals are being cut behind the scenes with regards to future entitlements, and who is ultimately playing who?