During that Q & A at last night’s event I was asked about the recent poll in which 78% of Afghans polled nationally believe that “things are generally going in the right direction”. Of course, when one reads that, and doesn’t delve any deeper analytically, it looks automatically fantastic, and to those that support our continued role in combat operations it is ‘proof positive’ that we’re succeeding.

1,758 individuals were questioned for the poll conducted by Environics. In Kandahar, where we are currently militarily focused, 15% of those polled said that they felt more secure. But asked if things in the same province were heading in the wrong direction, 34% of those polled responded that they felt less safe.

In other areas, including those regarding women’s rights and reconstruction, the poll was very positive, which is fantastic. But then again, it’s bound to be in areas that are militarily occupied by foreign forces. The question is, without their presence, what happens?

Now, some might see that as justification for our presence, but the reality is that we cannot remain there forever ensuring that atmosphere. At some point we will have to come to terms with the fact that the government and the Taliban will have to enter into negotiations, and that is where things become interesting with regards to the poll.

85% of Afghans believe that the government should negotiate with the Taliban, with 72% saying that a coalition government with the Taliban would be acceptable. And while one in three believe that the Taliban would return to power were foreign forces to pull out before the armed forces and police were better trained, the exact same ratio also believes that suicide bombings are sometimes justified – a rather odd juxtaposition.

These numbers are interesting in that while the government has made overtures with regards to negotiations, the Taliban has responded by saying that it will not enter into them unless foreign forces leave the country and the possibility of the implementation of Shiria law is not automatically discounted. Thus, to some extent, those polled realize that give and take will be required for government to function. It is also interesting to note that while those polled believe that the police and armed forced require more training to ensure that the Taliban can’t militarily reassume power, a vast majority support the creation of a coalition government.

This is where things get sticky, and, in truth, have nothing to do with independent Afghan objectives. Given that the existence of Karzai’s government is entirely dependent on foreign assistance, those that have helped institute his government will, of course, want to play a key role in any negotiations held with the Taliban, placing Karzai in a very limited position. The fact remains that the West does not really want the Taliban involved in government, knowing full well that theirs is a movement that is not limited to Afghanistan alone but parts of Pakistan as well. The fact remains, if Afghanistan is to move forward as a sovereign state, it must have the ability to conduct its affairs without foreign interference, but that has real risks as it pertains to the nation’s future. Thus, we find ourselves full circle.

Both the current government of Afghanistan and the Taliban receive support from outside of the country itself. Pashtun refugees and sympathetic militants in Waziristan bolster the Taliban’s numbers while the Afghan government relies massively on occupational forces for its survival. Both also receive funding from parties dedicated to their survival.

The ANA’s leadership is replete with ex-UIF commanders, with much of the UIF’s strength having been absorbed into the ANA following the 2001 invasion. This raises questions, of course, being that UIF fighters are not wholly inexperienced, having fought the Taliban during their rise to power in the 90’s. They were also used as a proxy force by the United States during the initial invasion of Afghanistan as well. Thus, to claim that the ranks of the ANA are in dire need of military training assistance is somewhat curious. If anything, the problem lies in their income, which is significantly lower than that paid Taliban fighters. Ideology also plays a role as well. Like the Taliban, the UIF spent a considerable amount of time attempting to gain control of the country itself. Overcome by the Taliban in the late 90’s, they were forced to carry out significantly diminished operations because of their limited position. That said; the creation of a coalition government would most certainly see internal military struggles arise, not to mention clashes between those members of the current government that are ex-UIF and their Taliban counterparts.

The reality of Afghan reconciliation is immensely complex primarily because throughout its history it has never actually occurred on a truly national level. Beyond the economic and military questions that currently plague it, the country is home to Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, Aimak, Baloch, with just over 9% of the remainder of the population being comprised of smaller groups. Throughout its history it has been a crossroads of conflict and conquest, having been thusly influenced by the Median and Persian Empires, the Kushans, Hepthalites, Arabs, Turks, Mongols, British, and Russians. Following the defeat of the Soviets in the late 80’s, the turmoil that gripped the nation as a whole was disastrous, with even the Taliban regime not fully in control of the country as a whole following their ascent to power. After 9/11, and the subsequent invasion of the country, that turmoil became the business of the United States and its allies, including Canada. Thus, we now find ourselves in a position of trying to solve a puzzle that is actually older than the nation that we inhabit.

So what is to be done and what role should Canada play in Afghanistan’s future? Like numerous examples of foreign military interference in the latter half of the 20th century, we find ourselves in the position of having become part of a mess that we now believe we must clean up. Unfortunately, we have historical precedent working against us, which is something that should never be disregarded when it comes to such matters. In fact, it shouldn’t have been prior to our agreement to enter into combat operations in the first place. That lack of foresight rests with those in government and at the head of our military that, I would assume, couldn’t find the time to pick up a book and do some reading about what it was they were getting us into. Being that our initial role was to provide security in Kabul and work to help reconstitute its infrastructure, it cannot be overlooked that our use in direct military operations emerged from the reallocation of US assets with regards to the invasion of Iraq. As it stands now, the Germans have more military personnel in Afghanistan, and yet they do not operate in a combat capacity. Thus, there obviously is a distinct difference between providing security in areas in which reconstitution is occurring and overt military operations.

A confidential media source with knowledge of meetings between Canadian officials and the US Department of Defense recently told me that during a meeting prior to the invasion of Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld made it quite clear that it was expected of us to participate in combat operations. Such pressures, though commonly only suspected by many that comment on this issue, provide evidence that the US invasion of Iraq, and the reallocation of US assets from the Afghan theatre, was an overwhelming factor in Canada assuming a far more directed combat role. It was at this juncture that public confusion began with regards to our involvement in Afghanistan, the redirection of our involvement skewed by the government to make it seem as though the status of our mission there had not been significantly altered.

If some 2,500 Canadians are being leaned on as the third largest foreign combat force in the country, questions have to be asked as to why, especially given the size of other contingents. The reason is that we agreed to allow our forces to be used in open combat operations against the Taliban where others have not, and have thus paid a hefty price for it. There are over 3,000 German military personnel in Afghanistan, but the German government refuses to allow them to be used in open combat operations against the Taliban insurgency. The Italians have over 2,000 and the same rule applies.

We are currently under British command and operating directly against the Taliban insurgency in Regional Command South. We are joined there by, as previously mentioned – the British, as well as the Americans, Australians, Estonians, Romanians, and Danes. Next to the British and Americans, our fighting force outnumbers the entire commitment of Estonia, Romania, and Denmark by more than 1,400, with most of them also having personnel committed elsewhere that still factor into that number. The Australians stationed in Kandahar number proximately 110, but operate in logistical, command, and liaison capacities only. So, the short of it is that we provide the third largest military contingent being used to fight the Taliban.

Since the 2001 invasion of the country, the British, who have some 6,700 troops on the ground at present, have lost 82 soldiers. Since 2002, Canada, with some 2,500 troops, has lost 71, the majority of those occurring after our relocation to Kandahar. In comparison, the United States, who instituted the invasion of the country, has lost just under 260 soldiers in hostile action.

Given the size of the Canadian contingent – you do the math. In six years of occupation and fighting we have lost approximately one fourth the number of soldiers than the nation that initiated the invasion in the first place, the very same that has used us to, in essence, bolster their flank while they went on a reckless venture elsewhere. Thus, it would seem that the German government is somewhat smarter than most, or at least can see a spade for what it is.

How many Canadian lives are we prepared to lose fighting a guerrilla force in an asymmetric situation? It’s obvious that despite our overwhelming conventional firepower that their resolve is not going to be broken – they’ve demonstrated as much for decades. Of course, there are those that will argue that we are fighting terrorism itself, and that by being in Afghanistan we are deterring terrorism from reaching our shores. To those that actually believe such fantasy, remember that the British Home Office concluded that the four men responsible for the London Bombings carried out the attacks having used information from the web to design the bombs used, and that no direct connection with al-Qaeda was ever established. Further, that their motive was probably one geared more towards their outrage with regards to British foreign policy and the xenophobic realities they faced in England post 9/11, if not before.

Helping bring Afghanistan into a new era in which it can look to securing itself, healing its divisions, and progressing is not something that I am opposed to. But it is something that is impossible if we are to insist that the outcome be one that we are entirely comfortable with. Until such a mindset is disregarded in favour of entertaining other options, real progress will not be made in Afghanistan, only the appearance of it. That must be Canada’s primary role in Afghanistan – to spearhead the alteration of such an understanding and work towards a national reconciliation that may very well produce very real challenges, but ones that are Afghanistan’s to navigate and overcome. Only then will Afghanistan be truly Afghan.