With regards to Pat’s entry below this, I must admit that I will be happy to see Hillier go. Of course, Pat has far more direct experience regarding matters to do with the Canadian Armed forces, being that he is a retired Captain, served two tours in Afghanistan, and also served in the Balkans. That being the case, his insights are of import, and you should definitely read his latest entry.

My personal feelings on the matter have to do with two of what I feel were Hillier’s misgivings. The first was his overt use of the media to unabashedly promote our combat role in Afghanistan. That is, with regards to the Armed Forces in any democratic society, not the place of any active military commander. Knowing that the average soldier can’t comment on operations, Hillier’s perspective and words became the focal point for many Canadians with regards to how they view the war, which, as I have said, was entirely inappropriate given that in any free society the military establishment should never be given license to promote a military agenda directly to the populace. That is the role of elected officials who are supposed to direct the actions of the military, meaning that Hillier should have never been allowed to appear on televised broadcasts by the Harper administration to bolster support for our role in the conflict. That said; even though Hillier himself seemed a more than willing participant when it came to such things, it should not be overlooked that the politicization of his position was something premeditated by the current government of this country. And that, too, should be cause for alarm.

My second problem with Hillier was his apparent lack of knowledge, or disregard, of Afghan history, especially with regards to how its people, or at least factions representing segments of its population, have dealt with foreign occupations for centuries. And if he does possess significant knowledge in that area, he’s certainly never let on. In truth, Hillier was not alone with regards to not seriously examining such historical realities. I would contend that most of the foreign military leadership in Afghanistan has, for some bizarre reason, failed to take such a serious aspect of Afghan history into account. In fact, the British, above all, have been provided enough of a lesson in their own past to know better than to view the conflict as one that is simply an exercise in the deliverance of democracy. I am certainly no proponent of the Taliban, that is for certain, but when placed within the context of Afghan history with regards to the occupation of the country by foreign forces, the reality is that their entirely warped ideology becomes a secondary consideration to many, leaving their willingness to oppose foreign occupiers at the forefront. Obviously, given their tyrannical rule of the country prior to the invasion in 2001, a swath of the Afghan population is not going to forget what life under Taliban rule was like, just as many Afghans will never forget what life was like during the Soviet occupation.

Miscalculation is the reason why the resurgence of the Taliban occurred, and it had far more to do with a segment of the population viewing them as force willing to combat foreign occupation rather than one bent on supporting the reinstallation of a wholly corrupted theocracy. Therefore, despite the steadfast ideology of the Taliban’s core leadership, it would be very interesting to see what would occur amongst their rank and file, not to mention those civilian elements that support them, especially with regards to Pashtun refugees, were the Taliban to seriously consider the possibility of being included in the political process. In truth, it could very well diminish their numbers, altering the perceptions of those that view the group as a last bastion of anti-occupational traditionalism and exposing the Taliban leadership for what they truly are – a group unwilling to alter their immovable position, one steeped in religious fanaticism, simply because they are able to exploit a segment of their support based on the promotion of themselves as freedom fighters.

In September of last year, President Hamid Karzai, of whom I am also not a fan, did, in fact, extend an olive branch, and invited members of the Taliban’s leadership to enter into negotiations in hopes of reaching some form of ceasefire and work towards their inclusion in the political process. That invitation was also extended to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the country’s former Prime Minister, and the head of Hezb-e Islam. At the time, the United Nations reported that an increasing number of Taliban fighters were interested in laying down their arms, a fact that is rather telling.

What ISAF, and primarily the United States, has truly refused to consider is the exploitation of the political process as a means with which to defuse the situation. Rather than acting as peace brokers in hopes of stabilizing the country through political means that, in the end, might not produce the sort of immediate results that they’re after, they have, instead, dealt with the resurgence of the Taliban from an entirely military standpoint to ensure the instillation of a pro-Western government, which is in many ways just as suspect as the motives of those they are fighting. Of course, the core leadership of the Taliban has refused to enter into negotiations unless foreign forces leave the country, which is another way of saying that their forces would be on the streets of Kabul in a month’s time and political negotiations would probably be limited to executions. That said; context must be examined with regards to the difference between the ambitions of the group’s core leadership and those that have joined their ranks solely because they believe they are actively waging a war to dispel foreign invaders, not necessarily help reestablish a backwards theocracy governed by hypocrites.

The complexities of Afghan society, and the nation’s history, are profound. The situation, even as it applies to the common rank and file of the Taliban’s forces, is not black and white. With the ability to draw men willing to fight simply to make a living from a significant pool of Pashtun refugees, the Taliban are able to project an inflated sense of support for their ideologies, which we then take as law and use as an excuse not to realistically examine such complexities, nor exploit them in an attempt to begin defusing hostilities.