Outing The Ghost Government

There are those that you antagonize because you know that there won’t be serious repercussions and those that you do not. Heated rhetoric aimed at Iran is one thing, but outing the Pakistani ISI is another matter altogether. Like it or not, agree with it or not, the reality is that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence is an extremely powerful entity, one that routinely transcends the authority of Pakistan’s government. The ISI has been referred to as Pakistan’s Ghost Government on more than one occasion, and even Pervez Musharraf, who was, for all intents and purposes, a military dictator, lived with the reality that if you do not possess the confidence and favour of the ISI then you are in the wilderness.

After the assassination of Benazir Bhutto it was speculated by many that the ISI was complicit, even if their involvement was limited to the employment or financing of others to accomplish the deed itself. Bhutto must have been fully aware when she returned to Pakistan that the ISI would be a problem were she to succeed in securing her old office. She must have also been aware of the fact that they most likely viewed her as little more than a US political proxy. Those in and around Washington that pushed for her return given the state of Pakistani politics at the time severely underestimated the ISI’s resolve in my opinion, and it ultimately cost Bhutto her life.

One thing that should be taken into account is that the ISI is, more than likely, not afraid of the United States. They have, in the past, worked closely with the CIA, and are by no means strangers with regards to American covert practices. In truth, they have probably been the most significant force behind Pakistan’s double dealings with the US since 9/11, placating US interests when it suits their purposed while supporting those that serve their own, the Taliban included.

In yesterday’s New York Times, an article by Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt was published entitled Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say. An excerpt…

“American intelligence agencies have concluded that members of Pakistan’s powerful spy service helped plan the deadly July 7 bombing of India’s embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, according to United States government officials.

The conclusion was based on intercepted communications between Pakistani intelligence officers and militants who carried out the attack, the officials said, providing the clearest evidence to date that Pakistani intelligence officers are actively undermining American efforts to combat militants in the region.

The American officials also said there was new information showing that members of the Pakistani intelligence service were increasingly providing militants with details about the American campaign against them, in some cases allowing militants to avoid American missile strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Concerns about the role played by Pakistani intelligence not only has strained relations between the United States and Pakistan, a longtime ally, but also has fanned tensions between Pakistan and its archrival, India. Within days of the bombings, Indian officials accused the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, of helping to orchestrate the attack in Kabul, which killed 54, including an Indian defense attaché.

This week, Pakistani troops clashed with Indian forces in the contested region of Kashmir, threatening to fray an uneasy cease-fire that has held since November 2003.

The New York Times reported this week that a top Central Intelligence Agency official traveled to Pakistan this month to confront senior Pakistani officials with information about support provided by members of the ISI to militant groups. It had not been known that American intelligence agencies concluded that elements of Pakistani intelligence provided direct support for the attack in Kabul.”

The publication of this story has, of course, spread like wildfire, resulting in a statement today by the Pakistani government claiming that the ISI was not involved in the Kabul bombing. Among those that have picked up on it are The BBC, The CBC, The Los Angeles Times, The Guardian, and Reuters, just to name a brief few. The point being, the world is out, and now a very dangerous game of US covert interventionism and Pakistani culpable deniability will no doubt ensue. But the real motivation behind the revelation of the ISI’s involvement in the Kabul bombing by the CIA could have very little to do with an attempt to egregiously expose the ISI’s support of insurgents that operate along the Pakistan-Afghan frontier and use the information to fan another flame altogether.

The Probable Squeeze Play

First, this morning finds the article penned by the New York Times’ Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt in yesterday’s publication ‘updated’. The exact same body of text quoted above now reads…

“A top Central Intelligence Agency official traveled secretly to Islamabad this month to confront Pakistan’s most senior officials with new information about ties between the country’s powerful spy service and militants operating in Pakistan’s tribal areas, according to American military and intelligence officials.

The C.I.A. emissary presented evidence showing that members of the spy service had deepened their ties with some militant groups that were responsible for a surge of violence in Afghanistan, possibly including the suicide bombing this month of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, the officials said.

The decision to confront Pakistan with what the officials described as a new C.I.A. assessment of the spy service’s activities seemed to be the bluntest American warning to Pakistan since shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks about the ties between the spy service and Islamic militants.

The C.I.A. assessment specifically points to links between members of the spy service, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, and the militant network led by Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani, which American officials believe maintains close ties to senior figures of Al Qaeda in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

The C.I.A. has depended heavily on the ISI for information about militants in Pakistan, despite longstanding concerns about divided loyalties within the Pakistani spy service, which had close relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan before the Sept. 11 attacks.

That ISI officers have maintained important ties to anti-American militants has been the subject of previous reports in The New York Times. But the C.I.A. and the Bush administration have generally sought to avoid criticism of Pakistan, which they regard as a crucial ally in the fight against terrorism.

The visit to Pakistan by the C.I.A. official, Stephen R. Kappes, the agency’s deputy director, was described by several American military and intelligence officials in interviews in recent days. Some of those who were interviewed made clear that they welcomed the decision by the C.I.A. to take a harder line toward the ISI’s dealings with militant groups.”

You will note that mention of tensions with India have been removed. This passage from yesterday’s version of the story is of paramount importance…

“Within days of the bombings, Indian officials accused the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, of helping to orchestrate the attack in Kabul, which killed 54, including an Indian defense attaché.”

To many this might seem of little consequence given historical tensions between the two nations, but the inevitable question must be asked – who furnished the Indians with information that the ISI was involved? Of course, given that the Indian embassy was the target, they could have come to that conclusion on their own, it’s not as if they lack the intelligence capability to unearth such information. But given the revelations now being provided by the United States, it is not outside the realm of possibility that the US provided the Indian government with that information in an attempt to open what could be referred to as ‘a second front’ with regards to using the Indians as part of a ‘squeeze play’ to regionally box the Pakistanis in. In that sense, Kashmir becomes the inevitable playing field in that arena, one which, if properly exploited, could result in the diversion of support intended for insurgents operating along the Pakistan-Afghan frontier. As was also pointed out in the initial article run by the New York Times yesterday…

“This week, Pakistani troops clashed with Indian forces in the contested region of Kashmir, threatening to fray an uneasy cease-fire that has held since November 2003.”

Reuters is also reporting the following…

“India said on Friday that peace talks with Pakistan were at the lowest point in their four-year history after a spate of bombings in Indian cities and at the country’s embassy in Kabul.

Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon said the blasts had “affected the future” of negotiations between the nuclear-armed neighbors.

“If you ask me to describe the state of the dialogue, it is in a place where it hasn’t been in the last four years,” Menon told reporters.

“We face a situation where things have happened in the recent past which were unfortunate and which quite frankly have affected the future of the dialogue.”

India blames Pakistan for a breach of a 2003 ceasefire on its de facto border in disputed Kashmir, and accuses its spy agency of involvement in last month’s bomb attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, in which two senior diplomats were among 58 people killed.”

In situations such as this, motive is always a factor. US motives are plain enough – there must be a serious transformation of the Pakistani political landscape so that the ISI’s powers are either limited or altogether removed. Bhutto’s return was certainly a part of US efforts to upset that balance. Of course, the ISI aren’t fools, and are well aware of how the United States operates when it comes to the differentiation between promoted initiatives and covert ones. They, themselves, have been running the very same game against the US since 9/11. Publicly they claim that they are not aiding militants involved in operations in Afghanistan, or that if elements with the ISI are involved in such activities that they will be rooted out. Privately they continue to support those groups that they view, and have viewed for some time, as vital to the spread of Pakistani influence in the region. And they will, make no mistake, be patient and wait for the United States to act rashly with regards to unilateral military operations within Pakistan itself, which will only further their domination over the Pakistani government and ultimately lead to a growth in public support as it pertains to confronting the United States as a foreign aggressor that is threatening Pakistani sovereignty.

This is where the Indians become a crucial part of the equation, and again, motive must be examined. If the United States did furnish the Indian government intelligence with regards to the ISI’s role in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, what do the Americans get out of it – or, better, yet, what leverage do they possess to help ensure that the Indian government plays ball. Well, interestingly enough, and only a day after that initial New York Times article was published…

“The governors of the U.N. nuclear watchdog approved an inspections plan for India on Friday, an important step towards completing a nuclear cooperation deal between New Delhi and the United States.

The plan, approved by consensus by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s board of governors, will permit regular IAEA surveillance of India’s declared civilian nuclear energy plants — 14 of 22 existing or planned reactors.

This clears a hurdle to an accord that would allow sales of atomic materials and technology for civilian use to India. The deal has been criticized because New Delhi has not signed the global Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).”

This is, I am sad to report, how things work. There are back channels for back channels when it comes to the covert agendas of nations that are often conveniently appropriated through openly negotiated dealings. It is no secret that the United States and India have been working on this deal for some time now, but given the situation in Pakistan, and the fact that Afghanistan is beginning to resemble its former self more and more, securing the favour of traditional regional allies is quintessential.

The reason is clear enough.

Pakistan Has Always Been The Crux Of The Problem

After the Taliban was overthrown in 2001, were Pakistan not a regional factor, the reconstitution of the Taliban would never have occurred. The reality is, and has always been, that the war in Afghanistan is perpetuated by the support provided by those within Pakistan that view the success of what they view as military proxies as quintessential with regards to securing Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. That was why Benazir Bhutto backed supporting the Taliban in the 90’s and why the ISI supports them today.

It is very important to remember that, prior to 9/11, the United States possessed a very cool outlook towards Pakistan, one fermented by their acquisition and development of a nuclear weapons program. Despite the fact that the United States has never seriously condemned the Indians regarding theirs, the Pakistanis have always been another matter altogether, a position very likely cultivated during US cooperation with the ISI in the 80’s and their exposure to the organization’s mindset. Of course, there is a significant deal of hypocrisy involved as it pertains to the United States during that era, but that does not change the fact that both the CIA and the ISI are by no means strangers with regards to each others governing mindsets.

Following 9/11, unilaterally striking Pakistan was off the table - most likely because of their possession of a nuclear deterrent. Instead, the Bush Administration decided to ally itself with Pakistan’s military dictator, ironically casting him in an altogether ‘just’ light for as long as it served the administration’s ends. By the time it became clear that the Taliban were not defeated, and that their military prowess was growing, Musharraf became an obstacle that needed to be removed. Thus, various actions taken by his government to do with the diminishment of democratic freedoms were highlighted and Bhutto was ultimately thrust into the fray as a US-backed hopeful.

We all know how that turned out, and, as I stated earlier, the involvement of the ISI in her assassination should not be disregarded as mere speculation. In truth, if we’re to talk brass tacks, it was a move that the ISI had to make to ensure that foreign interventionism would not gain a significant foothold in the country.

But the fact remains that the war in Afghanistan is a war for Afghanistan, not a war to emancipate a people from a once ruthless regime. It is a conflict that is being fought by Western powers against insurgents supported by one of the region’s foremost covert military organizations that possess decades worth of experience when it comes to using regional militants to their advantage. Seven years after the fact, Western powers are finally waking up to that reality, though there is little that they can do about it without purposely orchestrating a coup within Pakistan or targeting both insurgent and Pakistani forces within the country itself without hesitation or excuse. Unfortunately, Pakistan is not Afghanistan, and to do so would lead to an outcome that would make the war in Iraq look like a child’s birthday party.

Calling a spade a spade is one thing. But the game that has seemingly been initiated by the United States regarding the ISI’s culpability is a very dangerous one indeed.