When you invade a country like Afghanistan it’s always better to do it with inside help. Paying off such help, of course, is a crucial part if it – whether it be through financial considerations, arms, agreeing to look the other way regarding poppy production, or promises regarding positions within the country following said invasion.
When it comes to Afghanistan post 9/11, General Abdul Rashid Dostum remains one of the most troubling Northern Alliance commanders tapped by the United States during the 2001 invasion. Mistrusted by the CIA, even though he was reportedly on their payroll at the time, he would be responsible for the most egregious war crime to take place in post 9/11 Afghanistan – the Dasht-i-Leili massacre – which the Obama Administration has, eight years after the fact, ordered to be investigated. While Dostun is no longer a general in the Afghan army given his role in the kidnapping of Akbar Bai, he retains significant influence within the Afghan Uzbek community.
At the time of the invasion Dostum was one of three Northern Alliance commanders. Given the freedom afforded them during the early stages of the invasion, it was not uncommon for individuals such as Dostum to take advantage of the chaos of that environment. The transfer of prisoners to US authorities is one example of corrupted practices given that many of the individuals that were rounded up were innocent of any affiliation with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or any other such organization. In many cases it was simply a matter of placating the Americans with little regard as to who was actually innocent or not. In the case of the Dasht-i-Leili massacre, Dostum’s forces were transporting Talib fighters that had surrendered.
Abdul Rashid Dostum’s history reads like a bad John le Carré novel. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan he fought with Soviet forces (he was trained in the Soviet Union) against the Mujahideen, then backed by numerous nations including the United States. After the collapse of the USSR, the power struggle that consumed Afghanistan saw Dostum turn on his former President, the Soviet backed Mohammad Najibullah, and allied himself with the Mujahideen commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. In 1992, the two captured Kabul and remained allied so that they could deal with the forces of another military commander that had fought the Soviet occupation, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Two years later, Dostum would once again switch allegiances, allying himself with Hekmatyar against Ahmad Shah Massoud and the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani. As an aside, the United States designated Hekmatyar as a ‘Specially Designated Global International Terrorist’ in 2003.
After the Taliban’s rise, Dostum allied himself with Burhanuddin Rabbani, whom he had, as mentioned in the last paragraph, fought several years earlier. But he also attempted to play the other side of the fence, sending aircraft technicians to help restore MIG-21’s captured by the Taliban. When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, leading to the retreat of Northern Alliance forces, Dostum found himself in the midst of a power struggle within his own faction. General Abdul Malik Pahlawan, then a subordinate of Dostun, accused him of being complicit in the murder of his brother. In an attempt to have Dostum permanently removed from power, the general entered into an agreement with the Taliban in which he would deliver them Northern Alliance commander Ismail Khan and allow them to enter Mazar-i-Sharif, effectively gifting them control over most of Northern Afghanistan. Of course, at the time Malik was under the assumption that his forces would retain control of the region as a proxy force. While Dostum was forced to flee to Turkey, Malik soon learned that the Taliban had no intention of keeping their promises, ordering that his men be disarmed. This led to Malik’s decision to turn on his new allies, and with the help of Northern Alliance forces drove them out of Mazar-i-Sharif in late 1997. Following the Taliban’s defeat, Dostum returned from exile and proceeded to drive Malik out of Mazar-i-Sharif, which he controlled for a short period before, once again, being forced to flee back to Turkey.
I don’t know if you’re still with me at this point or if you’re pounding your head against a wall – but there’s more.
In 2001, funded by his one time ally/enemy Ahmad Shah Massoud, Dostun returned to Afghanistan to assist the Northern Alliance in an operation to open a new front against the Taliban. Dostum would become one of three primary leaders of the Northern Alliance, along with General Mohammed Fahim and Ismail Khan.
Dasht-i-Leili
As mentioned earlier, the CIA mistrusted Dostun, but given the ever growing atmosphere of politicization at Langley, those within the agency that probably warned against utilizing Dostun were most likely ignored. In the end, CIA paramilitary officer John Micheal Spann (Directorate of Operations) arrived in the Dariya Suf to secure communications followed a day later by a two-dozen members of Operational Detachment Alpha. This incursion, while small, effectively began the invasion. Dostun’s forces would combine with US Special Forces to attack Kunduz, which they took in late November. The desertion rate following the operation was considerable, leading to most surrendering their arms outside of Mazar-i-Sharif. Those taken prisoner were to be transferred to Sheberghan prison.
The prisoners were loaded into large, sealed metal truck containers to be transported. During the crossing of the Dasht-e-Leili desert many of them suffocated to death. When those traveling with the convoy discovered what was occurring, the sides of the containers were sprayed with small arms fire, the purpose being to provide holes through which air could travel. Of course, the tactic only resulted in more deaths.
It is here that it should be pointed out that the soldiers accompanying that convoy were under Dostum’s command and were joined by members of US Special Forces.
While the massacre received some attention shortly after it happened, it was, for the most part, convoluted by the military until the story went cold and was eventually swept under the rug. That is, until a mass grave was discovered.
The preliminary findings were that a forensic excavation was required to determine the identities of the victims. Three bodies that were exhumed by a UN forensic team lead them to conclude that all three had died of suffocation. In 2008 it was discovered that the site of the grave had been tampered with and that the bodies within it were most likely removed. Local witnesses, fearing the consequences, largely refused to cooperate with investigators.
From the Associated Press, December, 2008…
“The U.N. confirmed Friday that a mass grave in northern Afghanistan has been disturbed, raising the possibility that evidence supporting allegations of a massacre seven years ago may have been removed.
The Dasht-e-Leili grave site holds as many as 2,000 bodies of Taliban prisoners who died in transit after surrendering during one of the regime’s last stands in November 2001, according to a State Department report from 2002.
McClatchy Newspapers first reported the tampering with the grave site on Thursday.”
The number of those killed remains unknown. Some place the figure at around 250 while others claim it upwards of 2,000. But one thing is for certain. No matter who was in charge of the movement of those prisoners, US military personnel were present – which means, at the very least, they stood by and did nothing. And while it is possible that some of them could have reported the incident to their superiors, none of them have come forward publicly about it.
If adequate suspicion is what you require, take the following into consideration. The International Red Cross has been calling for an investigation since 2001 and has been rebuffed by NATO for eight years. Added to that, the Bush Administration repeatedly discouraged any official probe into the massacre. It is only now, eight years after the fact, that the Obama Administration has finally decided to investigate what occurred. Unfortunately, given the time that’s passed, the chances of that probe producing actionable results are slim to none.
