I’m not going to bother really speculating about what happened in Mumbai. To many it will be viewed as an al-Qaeda plot, to others an operation undertaken by the Kashmiri group Lashkar-e-Taiba. While aspects of it appear to reveal significant training and preparation on the part of those responsible, something that I have even asserted, a question has to be asked, one that I had not asked myself until this morning – has all the speculation floating around done more to define the intentions of the attackers than their true intentions?
The Telegraph is reporting today that the only surviving member of the group behind the attacks, which is now in Indian custody, is believed to have joined Lashkar-e-Taiba a year ago and that he received training at a camp in Pakistani governed Kashmir where the plot was hatched. That, of course, would rule out al-Qaeda and place the emphasis on the ongoing Kashmiri conflict that has raged on and off between India and Pakistan since 1947. Then again, Lashkar-e-Taiba released a statement almost immediately denying any responsibility. Depending on the severity of the interrogation techniques being used by the Indians on the 19-year-old in custody, he could be copping to the Kennedy assassination for all we know. The Indians have already taken the position that Pakistan was the group’s point of origin, so ensuring that outcome might be something that they’re not willing to abandon at this point, despite the reaction of the Pakistani government, no matter what the boy in custody says – which, of course, we’ll never actually be privy to.
That said, Paul Cornish, the Chairman of Chatham House’s International Security Programme, has written an interesting article on the BBC’s website entitled The age of ‘celebrity terrorism’, in which he makes some interesting points. An excerpt…
“But, for all the horror of the Mumbai attack, there might have been much less to it than first met the eye, and a hasty and exaggerated response might have played more of a part, and given more meaning to the attack than it should.
Nobody appears to have heard of the Deccan Mujahideen - perhaps because they have never existed.
Perhaps it was not so difficult after all to plan and execute this attack: small arms and hand grenades are not hard to find, boats are scarcely specialised equipment, and Mumbai is a vast, open city with more than enough soft targets.
Perhaps we do not know enough about where the perpetrators are from, because they could have come from almost anywhere?
The terrorists were willing to show their faces on CCTV. Was this suicide for martyrdom - as in New York and Washington in 2001, and London in 2005 - or suicide for celebrity, as in Columbine in 1999 and Virginia Tech in 2007?
And perhaps so little is known of the terrorists’ cause, because they simply did not feel the need to have one.
The attack in Mumbai was obviously planned - but “military-style planning” (whatever that means) is probably not necessary for the mass murder of unarmed and unsuspecting civilians going about their business in crowded railway stations and restaurants.
This could also have been a plan which had a large gap where mission, cause or vision statement ought to have been.
But no matter. The terrorists might have assumed, quite correctly as it happens, that the world’s media and the terrorism analysis industry would very quickly fill in any gaps for them.”