During that Q & A at last night’s event I was asked about the recent poll in which 78% of Afghans polled nationally believe that “things are generally going in the right direction”. Of course, when one reads that, and doesn’t delve any deeper analytically, it looks automatically fantastic, and to those that support our continued role in combat operations it is ‘proof positive’ that we’re succeeding.
1,758 individuals were questioned for the poll conducted by Environics. In Kandahar, where we are currently militarily focused, 15% of those polled said that they felt more secure. But asked if things in the same province were heading in the wrong direction, 34% of those polled responded that they felt less safe.
In other areas, including those regarding women’s rights and reconstruction, the poll was very positive, which is fantastic. But then again, it’s bound to be in areas that are militarily occupied by foreign forces. The question is, without their presence, what happens?
Now, some might see that as justification for our presence, but the reality is that we cannot remain there forever ensuring that atmosphere. At some point we will have to come to terms with the fact that the government and the Taliban will have to enter into negotiations, and that is where things become interesting with regards to the poll.
85% of Afghans believe that the government should negotiate with the Taliban, with 72% saying that a coalition government with the Taliban would be acceptable. And while one in three believe that the Taliban would return to power were foreign forces to pull out before the armed forces and police were better trained, the exact same ratio also believes that suicide bombings are sometimes justified – a rather odd juxtaposition.
These numbers are interesting in that while the government has made overtures with regards to negotiations, the Taliban has responded by saying that it will not enter into them unless foreign forces leave the country and the possibility of the implementation of Shiria law is not automatically discounted. Thus, to some extent, those polled realize that give and take will be required for government to function. It is also interesting to note that while those polled believe that the police and armed forced require more training to ensure that the Taliban can’t militarily reassume power, a vast majority support the creation of a coalition government.
This is where things get sticky, and, in truth, have nothing to do with independent Afghan objectives. Given that the existence of Karzai’s government is entirely dependent on foreign assistance, those that have helped institute his government will, of course, want to play a key role in any negotiations held with the Taliban, placing Karzai in a very limited position. The fact remains that the West does not really want the Taliban involved in government, knowing full well that theirs is a movement that is not limited to Afghanistan alone but parts of Pakistan as well. The fact remains, if Afghanistan is to move forward as a sovereign state, it must have the ability to conduct its affairs without foreign interference, but that has real risks as it pertains to the nation’s future. Thus, we find ourselves full circle.
Both the current government of Afghanistan and the Taliban receive support from outside of the country itself. Pashtun refugees and sympathetic militants in Waziristan bolster the Taliban’s numbers while the Afghan government relies massively on occupational forces for its survival. Both also receive funding from parties dedicated to their survival.
The ANA’s leadership is replete with ex-UIF commanders, with much of the UIF’s strength having been absorbed into the ANA following the 2001 invasion. This raises questions, of course, being that UIF fighters are not wholly inexperienced, having fought the Taliban during their rise to power in the 90’s. They were also used as a proxy force by the United States during the initial invasion of Afghanistan as well. Thus, to claim that the ranks of the ANA are in dire need of military training assistance is somewhat curious. If anything, the problem lies in their income, which is significantly lower than that paid Taliban fighters. Ideology also plays a role as well. Like the Taliban, the UIF spent a considerable amount of time attempting to gain control of the country itself. Overcome by the Taliban in the late 90’s, they were forced to carry out significantly diminished operations because of their limited position. That said; the creation of a coalition government would most certainly see internal military struggles arise, not to mention clashes between those members of the current government that are ex-UIF and their Taliban counterparts.
The reality of Afghan reconciliation is immensely complex primarily because throughout its history it has never actually occurred on a truly national level. Beyond the economic and military questions that currently plague it, the country is home to Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, Aimak, Baloch, with just over 9% of the remainder of the population being comprised of smaller groups. Throughout its history it has been a crossroads of conflict and conquest, having been thusly influenced by the Median and Persian Empires, the Kushans, Hepthalites, Arabs, Turks, Mongols, British, and Russians. Following the defeat of the Soviets in the late 80’s, the turmoil that gripped the nation as a whole was disastrous, with even the Taliban regime not fully in control of the country as a whole following their ascent to power. After 9/11, and the subsequent invasion of the country, that turmoil became the business of the United States and its allies, including Canada. Thus, we now find ourselves in a position of trying to solve a puzzle that is actually older than the nation that we inhabit.
So what is to be done and what role should Canada play in Afghanistan’s future? Like numerous examples of foreign military interference in the latter half of the 20th century, we find ourselves in the position of having become part of a mess that we now believe we must clean up. Unfortunately, we have historical precedent working against us, which is something that should never be disregarded when it comes to such matters. In fact, it shouldn’t have been prior to our agreement to enter into combat operations in the first place. That lack of foresight rests with those in government and at the head of our military that, I would assume, couldn’t find the time to pick up a book and do some reading about what it was they were getting us into. Being that our initial role was to provide security in Kabul and work to help reconstitute its infrastructure, it cannot be overlooked that our use in direct military operations emerged from the reallocation of US assets with regards to the invasion of Iraq. As it stands now, the Germans have more military personnel in Afghanistan, and yet they do not operate in a combat capacity. Thus, there obviously is a distinct difference between providing security in areas in which reconstitution is occurring and overt military operations.
A confidential media source with knowledge of meetings between Canadian officials and the US Department of Defense recently told me that during a meeting prior to the invasion of Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld made it quite clear that it was expected of us to participate in combat operations. Such pressures, though commonly only suspected by many that comment on this issue, provide evidence that the US invasion of Iraq, and the reallocation of US assets from the Afghan theatre, was an overwhelming factor in Canada assuming a far more directed combat role. It was at this juncture that public confusion began with regards to our involvement in Afghanistan, the redirection of our involvement skewed by the government to make it seem as though the status of our mission there had not been significantly altered.
If some 2,500 Canadians are being leaned on as the third largest foreign combat force in the country, questions have to be asked as to why, especially given the size of other contingents. The reason is that we agreed to allow our forces to be used in open combat operations against the Taliban where others have not, and have thus paid a hefty price for it. There are over 3,000 German military personnel in Afghanistan, but the German government refuses to allow them to be used in open combat operations against the Taliban insurgency. The Italians have over 2,000 and the same rule applies.
We are currently under British command and operating directly against the Taliban insurgency in Regional Command South. We are joined there by, as previously mentioned - the British, as well as the Americans, Australians, Estonians, Romanians, and Danes. Next to the British and Americans, our fighting force outnumbers the entire commitment of Estonia, Romania, and Denmark by more than 1,400, with most of them also having personnel committed elsewhere that still factor into that number. The Australians stationed in Kandahar number proximately 110, but operate in logistical, command, and liaison capacities only. So, the short of it is that we provide the third largest military contingent being used to fight the Taliban.
Since the 2001 invasion of the country, the British, who have some 6,700 troops on the ground at present, have lost 82 soldiers. Since 2002, Canada, with some 2,500 troops, has lost 71, the majority of those occurring after our relocation to Kandahar. In comparison, the United States, who instituted the invasion of the country, has lost just under 260 soldiers in hostile action.
Given the size of the Canadian contingent – you do the math. In six years of occupation and fighting we have lost approximately one fourth the number of soldiers than the nation that initiated the invasion in the first place, the very same that has used us to, in essence, bolster their flank while they went on a reckless venture elsewhere. Thus, it would seem that the German government is somewhat smarter than most, or at least can see a spade for what it is.
How many Canadian lives are we prepared to lose fighting a guerrilla force in an asymmetric situation? It’s obvious that despite our overwhelming conventional firepower that their resolve is not going to be broken – they’ve demonstrated as much for decades. Of course, there are those that will argue that we are fighting terrorism itself, and that by being in Afghanistan we are deterring terrorism from reaching our shores. To those that actually believe such fantasy, remember that the British Home Office concluded that the four men responsible for the London Bombings carried out the attacks having used information from the web to design the bombs used, and that no direct connection with al-Qaeda was ever established. Further, that their motive was probably one geared more towards their outrage with regards to British foreign policy and the xenophobic realities they faced in England post 9/11, if not before.
Helping bring Afghanistan into a new era in which it can look to securing itself, healing its divisions, and progressing is not something that I am opposed to. But it is something that is impossible if we are to insist that the outcome be one that we are entirely comfortable with. Until such a mindset is disregarded in favour of entertaining other options, real progress will not be made in Afghanistan, only the appearance of it. That must be Canada’s primary role in Afghanistan – to spearhead the alteration of such an understanding and work towards a national reconciliation that may very well produce very real challenges, but ones that are Afghanistan’s to navigate and overcome. Only then will Afghanistan be truly Afghan.
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That’s one of the most cogent and informed summaries of our participation in Afghanistan I’ve ever read.
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Quoting bc_boy:
definetly.
not much else to say to that.
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Hello Matthew!
I have just recently become an enlightened MG follower/fan. The Ottawa Citizen ran quite a piece about you and after reading it, I was hooked. You are a Man of huge insight and incredilble energies. Many many Kudos your way, Matt!! I’m so sorry I missed your show Oct. 18 in Ottawa - my birthday!
As far as I have seen, over the past 40 years, the ‘mid-east’ has been, is and always will be a disaster zone. We have no business, putting the lives of our military at risk, fighting for peace in a country where our definition of ‘peace’ will never come to be. Politicaly and Religiously they are people of extremes where balance/compromise can never be met because of their beliefs. It’s all so very sad.
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http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/arts/story.html?id=56058f24-66ae-4045-ad19-fbb921079a59
here it is incase you haven’t seen it, matt.
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After reading this article i do have a question… how has the tour been for you, compared to last time? (Mentally and physically). If you do choose to share that… it would be uber cool to know.
Thanks.
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that was a good read, both Matt’s commentary and the Citizen article … looking forward to tomorrow nights show !
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War succeeds in bringing us more war.
One dictatorship for another.
The saga continues.
So long as some of us are still around.
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pffft…what no eva mendes pic?
i mean - yeah. what you said.
and remember it’s not the survey that suggests success but the increased bombings in kabul that proves we have that taliban RIGHT where we want them.
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It’s ironic that at the same time the presence of Canadian troops and aid programs is improving life for women in Afghanistan, funding has been cut for womens programs by the conservatives here at home. The Harper government has decided on it’s own that women have reached equity with men despite the fact their average salaries are about 40% less. Far too many women in Canada are forced to remain in abusive relationships and poverty due to lack of resources and financial equity often with tragic concequences.
The Staus of Women in Canada is just as important as in Afghanistan!
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Quoting daala:
Ha! The title of the article is “Good beat the bad”. I just wouldn’t use that, because I can only guess that it’s been done a million times before - and it probably has just lost its touch. In fact, I’m going to go so far as to say it’s old. I haven’t even heard it before, and it’s old. That’s right… it’s so obvious, it’s just old. ;)
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Quoting daala:
Thanks for posting the link, daala It was a good read. :)
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There is one thing wrong with that article. The line in born losers refers to my ex-wife’s mother, not anything else.
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Quoting bc_boy:
That should go to show you what they really mean by promoting “women’s rights” in Afghanistan.
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That is a good article from the Citizen. I’ve had my own struggle with mental illness, in my case acute PTSD which is resistant to drug treatment. Despite that fact I also ended up dependent on ativan and other prescribed drugs and almost lost my life as my illness spiraled out of control.
Thank you for being so open in sharing your experience Matthew, you help remove the stigma that can make it hard for people to admit they even have an illness.
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Hi Matt and others,
I’ll place my biases up front, I’m a civilian postgraduate in War Studies (IR) at RMC, did some school at UBC and I study legitimacy in force against non-states (lets just go with force against “terrorists”)
I’m not one of these people that will jump on any of you and say you’re unpatriotic, in fact I think that this dialogue is about the most patriotic thing you can do, and rahter than hating the troops, it show concern for their welfare and the value of their contribution. However, I do believe you are ignorant to a certain perspective. No, before you jump on me for saying ignorant, I am not calling you ignorant, it was just the best way to illustrate the blindness that some show with regards to deployments like ours in Kandahar. And it may not be intentional, it may be that no person competant enough to articulate the message has tried, but there are smart people that do believe we should stay till our commitment is up and then continue to stay afterwards, we could get into a discussion of who could argue that intelligently and who couldn’t later (Hint: Stephen Harper would fall into the latter..)
I won’t lump you, Matt, into a group with say the folks that like sheep to an anti-establishment cause march across Burrard Street Bridge to the VAG to protest everything, yours, I will completely admit is a uniquely informed point of view. I commend you for that, but I do believe its an incomplete one.
“How many Canadian lives are we prepared to lose fighting a guerrilla force in an asymmetric situation?”
I was at a bar with a bunch of Roto 5 guys and girls (currently in Afghanistan is Roto 4) (actually this was across the street from Stages, where you’ll be playing) and they would say I have no doubt, as many as it takes for the mission. So too would their leaders, right up to LGen Leslie and Gen Hillier, and so too would their political leadership (who I would, by the way speak less highly of on other matters). They would do this, and they choose to go because the mission is just, it operates under consistent United Nations resolutions backing it, and simply cannot be compared to an invasion of Iraq which lacked the jus ad bellum legality.
To those that say we should be involved in Afghanistan only in a humanitarian context, Amitai Etzioni’s point that there has to be security first is begining to sound repetitive. The ICRC, CARE, MSF and the like would not be able to operate in a country run over by either the Taliban or warlords. There is a dire need for an external actor to provide security and for a short while, a secure environment was attained under the poorly-named Operation Enduring Freedom.
It certainly is tragic that once OEF lost track of Bin Laden, US commitment to the mission waned and its also tragic that because of its nature as an out of area operation, many European countries are less keen on contributing than to say, IFOR or even KFOR. But the mission carries on and we do our best to promote a secure environment, and its clear that you know, but others should as well, this is a multigenerational mission.
But this is where we are, we have a battlegroup in place and it is helping to provide security in a very insecure south. It is costing us (as many Americans say) blood and treasure but withdrawal before our commitment ends is not an option. It would cost us the valuable international reputation as a country that is willing to step up and pull its weight for a just cause, and more importantly, would ultimately lead to the failure of ISAF, and a grave danger to the people in Afghanistan.
Finally, theres a great book out there that was just released by a political scientist named Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang called An Unexpected War. If you haven’t read it already you really should. I’m not saying (and neither does the book) that the political process leading to present with regards to this mission have been perfect, but it comes down to a really simple thought. As long as we are doing *some* good, and making the lives of some people, whether Canadian, Afghani or hell any country in need better in some way, we are going to keep to that committment. And Kandahar is safer than it otherwise would be because we are there, and its certainly safer than it would be if we pulled ourselves from ISAF.
Matt, love the music and love the blog, keep it up!
Scott
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I could have used this blog post (or Matt himself) at Boston Pizza last night during a debate on this very topic and covering almost exactly all of these details.
Awesome work and a very insightful read. It depresses me that as a Poli Sci major with a heavy interest in international relations I am nowhere near the level of understanding that a self-educated musician is. Some school needs to slap you with an honorary degree or something, seriously.
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“Helping bring Afghanistan into a new era in which it can look to securing itself, healing its divisions, and progressing is not something that I am opposed to. But it is something that is impossible if we are to insist that the outcome be one that we are entirely comfortable with. Until such a mindset is disregarded in favour of entertaining other options, real progress will not be made in Afghanistan, only the appearance of it. That must be Canada’s primary role in Afghanistan – to spearhead the alteration of such an understanding and work towards a national reconciliation that may very well produce very real challenges, but ones that are Afghanistan’s to navigate and overcome. Only then will Afghanistan be truly Afghan.”
This doesn’t sound ignorant to me at all, Harper should put Matthew Good on the Afghanistan panel if he wants a policy with a real chance of success. Or at least entertain other options besides the pointless “War on Terror” we’re now locked into.
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Mattew Good: “There is one thing wrong with that article… “
Wow, was I ever off on lyric interpretation. I am embarrassed now.
Back on topic…
I read an article that very well summarizes Afghanistan and the situation there. The information in the article is incredible. It was full of history as well and I was just blown away by it. I believe Matt posted the link in the “life” section.
After reading that even the “allies” are wishing the Westerners would mfoove out and some even supporting the many different groups (whom fight against one another, whom use “Islam” teachings (quoted because the article explains how the teachings are modified and distorted from the original teachings) in religious schools, whom have more allegiance to money than religious leaders or Al-Queda, etc…). It was incredible but it all made perfect sense as well.
Don’t expect to see an end to our occupation, because it is a huge mess. We do make it safer, but at the same time, Western deployment of Western ideals on non-Western civilizations, whom remain as they are for many reasons including tradition/religion/”all they know”/and whom adjust and grow in ways THEY see fit (after all it is their lives, not ours), which really upsets many of the elders and those in power (Taliban and others) and that’s why it is also more dangerous.
What if rolls were reversed? What if we had English and French wars, each taking over Canada for a time, and this battle has existed since 1867 and maybe even before? How would we feel if China came in, and tried to force Cantonese (yes I know they speak Mandarin, but Cantonese has 7-9 tonal variations, as opposed to 4 used by Mandarin, so it is more difficult)? It would be a standard language, and we would no longer battle English vs French. Now let’s say we add in the violence sector, our wars over language were actually identical to the religious wars in the Middle East. Assume this is what we grew up with, what our great great grandparents grew up with.
How would you feel with having Cantonese forced down your throat?
This analogy is what many friends I met in University explained (not this exact analogy) to me; Western culture/ideals are vastly different from those in the Middle East and naturally will generate resistance. When you occupy a country, while making it safe, you also instigate more violence, by people who simply do not want someone else forcing stuff down their throat.
So we can expect extensions LONG beyond 2011.
Maybe by the time we actually reach Kyoto agreed levels of emissions our mission in Afghanistan will be over.
While our military would never trust the Taliban, or worse, Al-Queda, and I sure as hell wouldn’t either, perhaps a more peaceful solution could exist. While these groups learned (especially with the Russians) that annihilation is the only way, they can also learn other methods, such as those suggested by the Afghan government with the Taliban (peace talks). Sure, you can site hundreds of examples (Israel and Palestine, for example) where peace treaties failed, but it is better than annihilation!
It may be possible that you could actually teach someone not to hit without hitting them! Though it will take time, it is still possible and worth trying!
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Scott,
That’s a very respectful way of entering the discussion, it’s unfortunate more that take up the con don’t appreciate your tact.
I’d like to respond to everything but my time is short at the moment so I’ll just ask a few questions, and by no means are they intended to attack your opinions or dismiss your findings to date.
Could you expand on how Matt is ignorant?
Do you accept the fact that as far as I can see that the proposal isn’t so much for withdrawal of forces but an amendment to current tactic and strategy with a view to ending combat operations - which in all honesty is EVERYONE’s goal?
What is the best case scenario if combat operations were to altered or ended for the CF? What would the results be?
What is the worst case scenario for the above questions?
You are of the opinion that Matt’s observations are incomplete - are your’s?
What is qualified for a complete opinion? To have served on any Roto? I have come across a number of soldiers who are not a fan of current tactic and strategy - some from Kingston. Some from Op APPOLLO, some from ARCHER, some from the most recent operation in all different trades and from different levels of planning HQs.
I don’t think that makes my opinion complete - but I would argue your bar friends don’t make your observations and opinions any more qualified than Matt’s.
As for them lobbying for the need of those paying the ultimate sacrifice to complete the mission - soldiers do have a habit of over romanticizing death for queen and country in bar type settings. I’m not saying this is the case - the mess is where the best PD happens - but really would every soldier agree on the exact parameters of the mission? The answer is likely no - as I’ve heard from some that we should “scale back offensive ops” to “carpet bomb them all”.
Every operation is different.
Soldiers are a view on the ground and their accounts must be heard. But it’s not the complete opinion and in all honesty a Canadian Soldier doesn’t know the meaning of quit - so few are going to concede defeat or wrong.
The foreign policy and strategy is the debate - not the conviction and willingness of soldiers to see victory and accomplishment.
The argument for security to reconstruction is a very large, and to date, open ended argument. As there are many examples as to why nothing else has been tried than current strategies and a lot depends on how you measure success. On the one hand you could say that many re constructive efforts have been achieved. That an example has been provided and that there are schools and commerce where there once was none. That, critically speaking, doesn’t make a pitch for offensive security operations where collateral damage could result in the losing of H’s & M’s of those the reconstruction efforts win.
And…holy crap…I wanted to say more but I gotta go. Enjoyed your comment.
Your’s
ps. when were you at mil col?
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I think you touched on an important point, that of a incomplete observations or perspective.
This goes for me as well of course, my view as a grad student at RMC, is at the strategic level, most individuals I interact with in an academic sense are Maj or LCol or senior civil servants. In the social sense I am exposed to ocadets and the odd group of soldiers that come through such as the roto 5 guys. I offer an incomplete perspective with my own personal biases, hell it says Department of National Defence on my business card. Both Matt and I, and all participants in this debate offer their own view, and each one is limited in its perspective, to be honest I enjoy reading about Matt’s much more than watching David Bercuson or Steven Staples on CBC…
But only by readers informing themselves on all these views, do I think that they arrive at their own more complete opinions.
I hoped to have explained what I meant by ignorant, but I certainly did not mean it as a perjorative term. Its the inescapable igorance of not being at the National Defence Command Centre, of not actually being a government whose objective is not just to protect its citizens, but to promote Canadian values and certainly protect those who cannot protect themselves.
Now all that stuff aside, there is much common ground here.
End to combat operations: absolutely an objective and I’m glad we agree that abandoning Afghanistan is not an option. Beyond 2009, I certainly would love Canada to rotate up out of Kandahar. Do you agree that the reason we are engaged in such kinetic operations is that we are in the most insecure part of the country? If so, by rotating out we would certainly be able to focus on peacebuilding tasks. But that still leaves the south in an unenviable situation. The two roadblocks to us redeploying out of Kandahar post-2009 are the caveats and unwillingness of some Alliance members to put their men and women in harm’s way so far out of area, and our insistance that we will not leave unless there is a competant provider of security to relieve us.
The worst case scenario for me if security was not the absolute priority and if military operations in any part of the country were lessened, if caveats were implemented on our troops or if insurgents were not hunted as aggressively as possible…
is that foreign troops and NGOs alike would be put in harm’s way by a reinvigorated insurgency, casualties would mount as public opinion would wane and ultimately the counterinsurgency would fail.
The US Army/Marine Corps 2006 Counterinsurgency Manual is useful for this debate, not only that it articulates a massive committment of manpower to defeat an insurgency and provide security, but also that it emphasises collaboration between the military and NGOs to promote an environment where an insurgency is not a preferable tool, where civilians are less likely to resort to violence.
Kandahar at the very least is our responsibility since we took command of the regional HQ. That means, to me, that the security of people living there is the responsibility of Canada, untill they can provide it for themselves. We both (and Matt as well) want the same thing, we may have slightly different ideas on how it can be achieved.
On a final note, the only jerks are the ones that shout the other side down. Matt, the people that messed up your van were douchebags, pardon the term. And Patrick, this has been worthwhile.
Cheers
Scott
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Postscript: On a completely unrelated and perhaps surprising note, does anyone know a way to get tickets for the CASBYs that does not involve playing “Wha Happened?”
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“Do you agree that the reason we are engaged in such kinetic operations is that we are in the most insecure part of the country? “
I do not agree with that no - I think that is over simplifying a very complex situation. I think kinetic and lethal effects have been selected as the means with which to defeat the Taliban through the separate command structure of Op EF and ISAF has little choice but to play ball if it is to operate in that AOR. There has been an attempt to synchronize non-lethal targeting with limited success. I speak to the increased violence since 02. Further there is absolutely no way offensive operations will result in the defeat of the Taliban in the South because Helmand is not a foot ball field where the game and end state is restricted to that AOR. The support network to the insurgent groups extend well outside the borders of Afghanistan and because of that winning every fire fight and effectively calling in any CAS msn will have little effect in the grand scheme of things.
In my archives you’ll find I am not about time lines for cessation as much as I am about cessation being tied to an event or an effect. The decision that qualifies and quantifies that event of effect cannot be left to DND/NDHQ alone. Cannot.
“Its the inescapable ignorance of not being at the National Defence Command Centre, of not actually being a government whose objective is not just to protect its citizens, but to promote Canadian values and certainly protect those who cannot protect themselves.”
Just checking - I’ve seen enough military affiliated persons coming on here and condemn some of the views simply because Matt has not been overseas. Not that I think he or any one else has to be to have an opinion on the subject or to not want to see repatriated soldiers - but that’s one of the reasons I think he enlisted me as an author.
Not all current or past serving members are of the same mind.
I may be of a minority, but not as small of one as some may think. One senior Artillery Officer in a recent seminar given on the Battle of Panjawai district when asked about his thoughts about what effect his part in the battle would have on hearts and minds replied - “In all honesty, for the majority of the planning for that battle I wasn’t thinking of it.”
I’m pretty sure he didn’t mean to be obtuse to the sensitive nature of the op, but that he was focussed on winning that all important 1st block of the 3-block war. That said, and as I mentioned earlier, every op is different and we can’t let any soldier’s opinon be construed as the all knowing all correct take on the operation or foreign policy as a whole.
As for the Circus that is NDCC I would never leave the promotion of something as subjective and intangible as Canadian Values to them. LCol’s and up have this nasty habit of being opportunistic when it comes to their careers and “situating the estimate” though that is a cardinal error on any AOC crse.
“The two roadblocks to us redeploying out of Kandahar post-2009 are the caveats and unwillingness of some Alliance members to put their men and women in harm’s way so far out of area, and our insistance that we will not leave unless there is a competent provider of security to relieve us.”
I agree to a point but I think that’s only if you maintain offensive operations which as I alluded earlier is really banging your head against the wall when you can’t hit those deeper lines in other neighboring countries to the ‘Stan.
Again there’s probably more - but the chicken’s burning and I leave this with you.
To this point the pleasure’s all mine.
TDV - 22078
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Quoting Scott D:
Seems like not too many people wanted to play that game - got this in my email from the Edge the other day:
“…because we want you there, we are giving away tickets EVERY HOUR until the day of the show! Listen and win!”
So, if you can stomach listening to the radio, maybe there’s a chance?
On another note, it has been my silent reading pleasure to have you jump into the conversations here. Thank you.
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Yeah the What Happened promo made it too exclusive…it also didn’t make it about the music…
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Quoting Scott D:
Being part of a government or military can be just as much a negative as a positive in cases like this. US commanders like Westmoreland in Vietnam should have been on top of the situation but because of the political straight-jacket applied by the Johnson admininstration were living in an intelligence fantasy land.
As Matt points out, one of the motivating forces in our Afghanistan mission was to indirectly support US forces in Iraq by taking over combat operations in the Kandahar region. If this simply was just a question of bringing peace and security to Afghanistan then it would probably be practical with the resources we have. The truth is we’re taking part in a much wider conflict that involves a complex mix of religion, culture, politics, economics and tradition. We could win every battle we face on the ground in Afghanistan and still fail in the wider mission as conditions deteriorate in Pakistan, Iraq, Uzbek, Iran, US, Europe etc…
You’re taking a much too narrow view on a very complex situation, just as is the Canadian government. It may play well in the media to visit the troops at the front and claim we’re representing Canadian values, but the truth of the matter is we’re indirectly supporting a dirty US war in Iraq and a Karzai government with a questionable record itself. I personally don’t support torture and don’t want my government to do so either. Same for the illegal drug trade.
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After some of the recent messes that have occurred as a result of differences of opinion on this site, it’s very refreshing to see that it is, in fact, still possible for two people to disagree without resorting to petty name-calling.
As someone who’s probably torn somewhere in the middle on this issue, I’m really enjoying an intelligent debate and was starting to lose hope that it was possible.
Not that any of them will read this anyway, but to all those people who come to this site for the sole purpose of stirring up shit on the boards, let Scott be proof that it is possible to disagree on a topic WITHOUT:
a) appearing uneducated,
b) dismissing differing opinions, or
c) using the terms ‘cocksucker’, ‘faggot’, or ‘homo’ as an argument (I know this one is tough for some people).
Just wanted to say thanks, as I was starting to lose faith in people as a whole.
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“Being part of a government or military can be just as much a negative as a positive in cases like this. US commanders like Westmoreland in Vietnam should have been on top of the situation but because of the political straight-jacket applied by the Johnson admininstration were living in an intelligence fantasy land.”
Prior to the Tet offensive (big defeat for the NVA BTW ) Recon patrols (snoop and poop) were so sick of having the photos they were taking of NVA troops coming south being ignored, they started sneaking out of their hides and taking Insignea off of suddenly dead NVA and sending that in as proof. When that failed, a body, fully clothed was left in a clearing clearly showing it’s Northern origins. That didn’t work; so the morale of many watching the Trail suffered. War is Hell.
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Tet is a great example of an intelligence breakdown for political reasons. After the several years the US had been in action in Vietnam it was poltically important for the national and military leadership to claim the opposition was close to defeat. As you say this led Westmoreland and others ignore clear signs that the VC and NVA were getting ready for a huge offensive.
And like you say Tet was a military loss for the communists, but it destroyed the trust of the journalists who had been taking Westmorelands reports as accurate and also many civilians in the US who began to see the conflict was in fact not drawing to a close.
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Thanks Matt; a great post indeed.
Maybe one way to get the ball rolling if for us to get the members of a possible coalition govt together to talk things through on there own. See how it goes and just stay away from the table ourselves. Not that the Americans would ever agree to it, but if they can come up with some resolutions to some of their problems, and if those solutions satisfy us then maybe thats a beginning.
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“That lack of foresight rests with those in government and at the head of our military that, I would assume, couldn’t find the time to pick up a book and do some reading about what it was they were getting us into. “
Mr. Good - give us some credit. This is a well-read officer corps that deployed us to Afghanistan. We knew what we were getting into, and we advised our political leaders accordingly. Bill Graham and Gen Hillier conducted a nation-wide tour in late 2005, and I don’t know if we could have been any more clear on the expectation of casualties. As an officer corps, we also were very well-versed with the political/tribal/cultural/and historic nature of the conflict we were entering. However, the claim consistently made on this webpage and elsewhere that the Soviets and British lost; ergo, we will lose also is specious and illogical. Unlike those two occupying powers, most Afghans want us there, as the recent poll clearly articulates. Your comment sounds back-handed and arrogant, and unnecessary in the context of what was largely an articulate and well-formulated blog.
“That must be Canada’s primary role in Afghanistan – to spearhead the alteration of such an understanding and work towards a national reconciliation that may very well produce very real challenges, but ones that are Afghanistan’s to navigate and overcome.”
An eloquent and worthy goal. But remember, we’ve only got 2500 soldiers there - less than a brigade. Any influence we have will be at the provincial vice national level (Kandahar specifically), and then only barely. If we applied the same math we applied to Bosnia, NATO should be deploying nearly a quarter million soldiers to Afghanistan, vice the 40 000 OEF/ISAF soldiers currently there. However, Kandahar is the lynchpin for the whole country, and Canada has the chance to make a historic difference in a part of the world that needs and wants our help.
The Canadian Task Force conducted its own independent survey in early 2007. Depending on how you ask the question, there is over 80 per cent approval for ISAF in Kandahar Province. I for one hope we do not leave the NGOs, IOs, the burdgeoning middle class, and the desparately poor that depend on ISAF and specifically Canadian presence.
However, I will not be the first to note all is not rosy. Afghans can be justifiably frustrated by the lack of progress in development. Foreign soldiers have been in their country for nigh six years, and many promises have not been fulfilled. Also, the misuse of airpower and overdependence on artillery has often brought suffering the the civilian population commensurate to what the Taliban bring.
Listened to Hosptial Music all weekend in Jasper. Perfect for a chilly autumn weekend in the mountains.
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Perhaps you’d like to comment on the CFs study that took place before the current Afghanistan mission that ranked that country as the worst place for Canada to deploy troops on a combat mission. Or that the conservative Defence Minister last year stated that the Taliban wasn’t going to be defeated militarily.
As far as I’m concerned the conservatives are using the Afghanistan mission as just one more wedge issue to gain support for the upcoming election (whenever that is). As we’ve seen with the prisoner transfer question, the Canadian electorate is not being supplied with accurate information on the most important military mission since Korea, or on anything else for that matter.
Is it any wonder there are so many questions being asked.
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I read a great article on theFilter.ca about this very topic this morning:
http://thefilter.ca/articles/canada/why-canadian-forces-should-immediately-withdraw-from-afghanistan/
I thought I had my reasons for NOT supporting the war in Afganistan nailed after reading the piece ‘The Surreal Politics of Premeditated War’ on CommonDreams.org quite a while back…
However, the ‘theFilter.ca’ article by Michael Skinner makes the government’s case for supporting the USA’s neo-colonial objectves in Afghanistan even more transparently wrong on every count.
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Sorry, I know this is ages after the fact, but I just wanted to respond to your comments about the CBC/Environics poll, which has raised concern among people who have worked in Afghanistan. I was on a trip to Afghanistan when it was released, hence this timelag. I’ve now been frantically posting this everywhere (and quite tellingly, the vast majority of blogs have had reservations about the poll) since the deadline for public input to the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan is December 1st (see http://www.independent-panel-independant.ca/terms-eng.html) (please, people who are politically inclined, send in your comments).
If you’re still interested, here are some points that I think bear some discussion on the poll’s methodology:
Concerns with Validity -
Methodology involves entering people’s homes and ask people’s opinions on the military, especially the Afghan National Army/Afghan National Police. While the ANA/ANP are not quite like the militia in Iraq yet, they (esp the ANP) are very corrupt and often seen as dangerous to civilians.
Poll was conducted from September 17-24th, right at the beginning of the Holy month of Ramadan, which for many Muslims represents a period of charity and goodwill, and when the good that is done by fasting can be considered void is one speaks ill of others behind
their backs.
Afghans’ oral culture and hospitable nature makes the linearity, aggressively
direct, and confinement of responses into five categories of intensity (highly agree, somewhat agree, etc) bewildering. My own direct attempts at conducting quantitative research in Afghanistan are written up here (Kish grid, audience research survey):
http://cms.mit.edu/research/theses/SarahKamal2005.pdf, pages 42-3, 81-3. The problems I’ve listed in my Master’s thesis barely skim the surface of the research challenges I’ve continued to have while conducting my PhD.
I have spent 7 years working in and around Afghanistan as an academic, development practitioner, and “undercover Afghan.” As a Dari-speaking Afghan-looking woman, I have tended to find that after you scratch the surface of Afghan discourse, something else comes out that could never adequately be captured in as blunt and culturally unfamiliar a tool as a western poll. I usually find that people from other cultures tend not to appreciate the underlying resentment or suspicion felt by many Muslims towards the powerful West, and how quickly it can bubble up over a quiet discussion over a cup of tea.
Finding a good facilitator for polling is hard in Afghanistan. ACSOR has done polls for organizations like the Asia Foundation (said to have been founded with CIA funding) and the US state department, and their polls tend to have eyebrow raising results which run counter to other research but are advantageous for suggesting the military operations are running well. The Environics poll is not the first strange public opinion poll coming out of Afghanistan by ACSOR.
Sometimes the timing of the release of such polls is telling. I did a survey of publicly available public opinion in Afghanistan in Dec 2005, it is available here: http://c4o.unitycode.org/me/PeaceConditionalities.final.20060413.pdf . The studies that I looked at are listed in the appendix. Shortly after I finished this study (which found sharp pessimism and a downturn in public opinion), a new quantitative survey was released that claimed that Afghans were very pleased with the reconstruction process and international presence, released right before a major donor conference. This was in the same year that friends of mine were chased out of a UN compound in Jalalabad by angry mobs, who set fire to the compound. Also the same year as the Koran riots and Afghan Minister of Planning Bashardoost winning major public support in demanding that NGOs leave the country.
Methodology doesn’t state how questions were piloted. Were there ways of triangulating responses? For instance, if people are so positive about the future, why is it that in the Environics poll only 40% think the government and foreigners will prevail in the current conflict? (20% believe the Taliban will win, 40% don’t know). 20% believe Al Qaida is a positive force in the country - how does that mesh with other responses?
Concerns with generalizability -
Poor to non-existent communications and road infrastructure in rural areas, inadequate mapping, lack of security, illiteracy, widely divergent population estimates and shifting displaced populations hamper statistical generalizability of their poll.
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I have been in Afghanistan many times in the last 6 years, and in my three visits this year I found the security situation to be the worst I have ever seen. I first entered Afghanistan during the time of the Taliban, and even then did not feel as threatened as I did in my most recent journey in October 2007. There is no sense of safety anywhere, and even longtime Afghan friends of mine now feel uncomfortable entering downtown Kabul. Such fears could only have worsened with the Nov 6th suicide bomb killing children and MPs in Baghlan, formerly considered a “safe” area.
I have been wrong more times than I can count when it comes to Afghanistan, which I find a fascinating and unendingly complicated space. I don’t object to surprising research findings, but I do object to bad science that run counter to common sense. The Environics poll runs counter to what I and other longtime development workers have found to be the mood in the country (including a practitioner who has lived for 6 years in Kandahar). The poll is also dangerous, in my opinion, because the word for expressing the public’s mood that is more and more being bandied about in expert circles, and among Afghans, is “occupation.” I was a panelist at the Middle East Studies Association annual conference this weekend, and everybody there agreed with that framing. So I believe it is particularly important to not allow a poll (which, as we understand, even in the best of situations is just a poll and not reflective of anything other than what people choose to say to a pollster) to be taken as more than it is.
Cheers, and sorry for this long post,
Sarah Kamal
PhD Candidate, London School of Economics