A few clarifications regarding my last entry. With regards to Afghanistan, obviously the rhetoric that I employed was extreme. My reason for doing so was simple – to show that, despite what many Canadians believe, there is really no middle ground when it comes to our participation in direct combat operations. Peacekeeping is another matter altogether, as is aiding in reconstruction efforts, the first obviously being required to provide security for the second, but under a mandate that is not overtly aggressive. But that is not where we find ourselves at present, and Canadians should realize the difference between the two.

I find it interesting that the force employed during past conflicts seems to get overlooked when it comes to present conflicts, as if war has become something in which death and horror is not a reality any longer, or at least comes as a surprise when we find out that it is. During the Second World War, the bombing campaigns against both Germany and Japan were devastating, and did not go out of their way to minimize collateral damage. In fact, civilian demoralization was a goal, and one that produced significant results.

Now, I do not say this as an advocate for the use of such force, simply as a reminder that that is what war entails. There is no such thing as a clean war, though many have come to believe that such a thing can exist.

The second clarification that I would like to address is my reference to AFRICOM being headquartered in Ethiopia. If you research AFRICOM, which is the acronym for The United States Africa Command, you’ll discover that, according to the Department Of Defense, it is currently headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. AFRICOM was authorized in June of 2007 to the outrage of numerous African nations, among them Egypt, a long time US ally, who was ultimately excluded from its sphere of influence. The initial mandate of AFRICOM is similar to other US regional commands that were created after the Second World War. Though some of their names have been changed since, those initial commands are now represented by CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM. With the addition of AFRICOM, the United States now has joint military commands that encompass every region of the world. And while the Department of Defense lists the headquarters for all of them save EUCOM and AFRICOM as being on US soil, the reality is that adjunct regional command centers are, by no means, a thing of fantasy.

In the case of AFRICOM, there is widespread hostility towards it by many of the African nations that it covets. There are, of course, exceptions. Liberia, for example, has openly stated that it would host the command, though given the state of affairs in that nation it is entirely impractical (though that is not to say that some from of adjunct office might not ultimately be instituted there). Others that have been scouted include Gabon, Senegal, and Cameroon.

One nation, however, that has already stated that it will be working with AFRICOM is Ethiopia, a position that the country’s Prime Minister, Menes Zelawi, confirmed last fall. Ethiopia is also no stranger to US military training assistance. In 2004, a temporary base, Camp United, became home to training elements of the US 3rd Infantry, located near the Ethiopian Military Academy in Hurso, who were responsible for instruction in infantry fundamentals.

In December of 2006, Ethiopia, aided by the US Air Force and Special Forces teams, invaded Somalia to overthrow the ICU. In June of 2007, AFRICOM was authorized and then instituted in October of that year.

Added to this is the use of notorious Ethiopian prisons known for their use of torture to house detainees that have been used by the CIA and FBI for interrogation purposes.

Ultimately, AFRICOM’s ‘official’ residence might not ultimately be in Ethiopia, but there is no questioning the fact that, given US assistance to, and involvement with, Ethiopia, that its presence in that country is by no means slight. Of course, the United States has adamantly denied that AFRICOM’s purpose is geared towards the militarization of Africa. Unfortunately, given their complicity in the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, that stance is highly dubious.

Therefore, for the sake of factual accuracy, I will retract my previous assertion (for the time being, at least).

After years of cataloguing and commenting on world events on this website, I must admit that it has become somewhat of a chore. Obviously, my personal beliefs remain unaltered, but as the years have passed I have found myself suffering from a bizarre form of self induced anxiety because I feel that I’m unable to grant a myriad of subjects the attention that I feel they deserve, and in a manner that reflects their seriousness by providing the sort of attention to them that simply cannot be provided by a single person within a 24 hour time frame.

Being that the geopolitical landscape is fluid, it is very difficult to keep on top of a variety of events. Being that this website isn’t a news organization, nor do I have at my disposal the sorts of resources that such organizations have, it makes attempting to disseminate current events in a timely fashion rather difficult without simply posting an array of hyperlinks. In short, blogging isn’t supposed to be about directing readers to likeminded websites that contain information, but rather exist to provide an individual a platform to comment on those things that they feel important.

In my case, the problem is that so many of the things that I find important are interlinked with occurrences elsewhere, many of them steeped in the intrusions of foreign interventionism. Therefore, when commenting on, for example, the genocide in Sudan, a myriad of other factors become relevant, such as the fact that while the United States has declared it genocide, it works behind the scenes with the government in Khartoum on a program to use Sudanese nationals to infiltrate radical groups in Iraq. That, of course, then leads to Iraq and events regarding such radical groups. The same can be said of Somalia, where Ethiopian forces were backed by the United States to displace the ICU, which has led to one of the most overlooked humanitarian crises in Africa. In that instance, while the focus should be placed on the disastrous consequences of Ethiopia’s actions with regards to ordinary Somalis and what they have had to endure, it also cannot be overlooked that the United States not only supported the initial invasion of the country with Special Forces teams and air strikes, but that the US currently uses notoriously harsh Ethiopian jails to house detainees (Clarification with regards to my initial mention of AFRICOM).

Given these contradictions, it becomes extremely important to include them when dealing with base issues, those largely being the plights of the innocent simply caught in the middle, and who, while they have the world’s sympathy, remain in a state of perpetual limbo because ideological methodology remains at the root of such problems. In the case of Darfur, given China’s relationship with Sudan, the chances of the UN Security Council adopting a unanimous declaration that genocide is taking place in Darfur is slim to none. Were it to, given the UN Charter, immediate and substantial action would have to be taken. Therefore, it costs the Americans very little to claim it genocide. Knowing full well that China’s position will ensure that the Security Council does not reach a unanimous consensus, and therefore require that real action be taken, assuming the position that genocide is occurring costs the US nothing. And if that sounds ridiculous to some of you, consider Rwanda. At the time of the Rwandan genocide, much of the Security Council was unwilling to categorize it as genocide precisely because it would have meant that they would have had to intervene on a much greater level. Instead, they did not, and UNAMIR was left to wither, literally forcing its commander to go against his orders and refuse to leave the country after being told that UNAMIR’s mandate had been exhausted. In that instance, the French were particularly suspect being they had been involved in arming those that would ultimately undertake the slaughter, not to mention evacuating numerous individuals that were involved in masterminding it. Given the disaster that had befallen the US in Somalia prior to that, it too had very little desire to become involved in fear of a domestic backlash. Thus, while the world’s attention was on events in the Balkans, some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were massacred.

With regards to Darfur, initially AMIS (whose mandate forbade them to use force to protect civilians) was instituted after the UN found itself in the position of facing funding problems because many of the world’s wealthier nations refused to commit military resources to a substantial peacekeeping initiative. Obviously there were underlying issues, such as China’s opposition given their reliance on Sudanese oil and the fact that they are the primary supplier of arms to the Sudanese. But last summer, after things has become far too catastrophic to ignore any longer, UNAMID was instituted, which is a joint UN-AU force authorized by UN resolution 1769 whose mandate is set to last one year. It is under the command of Nigerian General Martin Luther Agwai.

Nothing is easy, not even responding to a genocidal situation. Like an onion, it has layers of conditions and corruptions, all of which must not only be seen to before the killing of innocents can be addressed, but must also be examined when confronting the reality of why such a situation is allowed to continue. Thus, while simply blogging about what has occurred in Sudan on a base level is important, is it equally as important to seriously confront such issues to reveal the hypocrisies of those who have, all along, possessed the ability to act, or to even aggressively demand that action be taken, but have failed to do so in a timely fashion. That includes the government of Sudan itself, which forbade the presence of UN peacekeepers until last year, and which, with regards to culpability and crimes against humanity, makes them susceptible to applicable international laws regarding genocide. Unfortunately, given the damage done the ICC since the invasion of Iraq and the US position that it will not adhere to its authority, the Sudanese find themselves in a comfortable gray area in which they too can ignore international law, having been provided precedent to fall back on with regards to war crimes prosecution.

That said; there’s an example of how a simple statement can become multidimensional in a matter of a few paragraphs. And, in truth, it’s just the tip of the iceberg. One of the most crucial aspects is, of course, personal experience. When it comes to Darfur, I will say that I deeply regret not going when I was offered the opportunity several years ago. Unfortunately, I was scheduled to begin touring at the time and therefore had to turn it down.

What Is Simple And What Is Not

Complexities reign. No situation is as black and white as it’s made out to be, not even those that are painted as struggles of good against evil.

I commented after the release of The Manley Report that if we’re to take confronting the Taliban in Afghanistan seriously then we must face the hard, cold truth that the abandonment of our morality is something that we are going to have to come to terms with. With most in government adamantly opposed to any process of negotiation, the alternative is – what? The pretense of nobly confronting and overcoming the Taliban? And how is that to be accomplished? By holding down the fort long enough for the Afghan military to reach a level of professionalism to deal with the problem? The truth is, a considerable portion of the Afghan military, including its leadership, is comprised of ex-Northern Alliance members that are, by no means, strangers to conflict, specifically fighting the Taliban. Therefore, how long will we have to wait before they’re able to return to doing what they did prior to the 2001 invasion, which was fighting the Taliban?

Of course, they did a piss poor job of it, and infighting didn’t help their cause either. That being the case, having tens of thousands of foreign troops around to work towards accomplishing what they couldn’t doesn’t seem like something they’d be in favour of disparaging. Which brings us back to our confrontation of the Taliban and what we hope to achieve.

If there is no place for the Taliban in the new Afghanistan, then it only stands to reason that they have to be eliminated, which means the application of overwhelming and inhumane force to decimate their will to wage war and disenfranchise that portion of the civilian population that supports them. That means that everyone, fighters and civilians alike, are equal opportunity targets. And given that the United States has ruled that Omar Kahdr, who was 15 years old when he was captured in Afghanistan, can be classified an enemy combatant because he belonged to an organization that is not recognized as a legitimate military force, child soldiers are fair game as well.

If you’re labouring under the misconception that there’s a more noble way to go about it, you’re dreaming. Unless, that is, you want Canadians to be in Afghanistan until hell freezes over and believe that the Taliban can actually be ‘waited out’. Because the reality is that were international forces to leave the country tomorrow, Mr. Karzai would be on a plane a day later headed for a life in exile and Kabul would be overrun in a matter of weeks. Therefore, given that reality, the most prudent course of action is to abandon this arrogant assumption that we’re ‘better’ than those we’re fighting and get to the business of eradicating them with extreme prejudice.

As for the inevitable backlash that it will occur on a global scale, what would it matter? We’re already in bed with the most despised nation on earth, no need to split hairs. We can’t retain our reputation and be involved in the sort of undertaking required to ensure victory without it being pissed on.

In March, this country may very well go to the polls over this issue, at great expense to the people of this country to boot. Thus, if you’re willing to support our continued role in combat operations in Afghanistan, stop hiding behind lame preconceived notions of nobility and justice and at least have the guts to admit that the only way that the job is going to get done is if we start displaying the same zealotry as those we’re fighting.

Handing prisoners over to be tortured by local authorities? It’s a waste of valuable time. We should just do it ourselves, on the spot, and forgo having to wait for actionable intelligence. If nothing comes of it, well, at least that’s one less enemy combatant to worry about. A sympathetic bullet to the back of the head and on with the business of winning. Because that’s what we’re there to do, win. Not fuck about worrying whether the people of the country we’re saving on their behalf have a problem with our tactics, not to mention bleeding hearts here at home. According to The Manley Report, the majority of Afghans want us there anyway, so our alteration in tactics is just going to have to be something they get used to if liberty is at all important to them.

Pakistan, of course, remains a problem. Our actions will, without question, plunge that nation into a further state of chaos, which means that we might have to be prepared to deal with it as well. Given that Bhutto is dead, and out best chance at implementing a puppet regime that would allow us free reign in Waziristan is gone, we’ll have to tread lightly until we see what becomes of Musharraf’s government. If Musharraf were willing to help us undertake the elimination of those in his own military establishment that have ties to radical groups, we could offer him some future considerations with regards to Afghanistan (what’s Karzai going to say, honestly?). We could even demand that the IAEA be granted access to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, which would, of course, provide us a backdoor with which to compromise it, and in doing so throw Musharraf a few extra bones, such as gifting him arms and promises that we will aid in any effort to protect his regime from other political elements within the country. Of course, we’ll also have to make him President as well, which, after putting a few key ‘international electoral observes’ in place, shouldn’t be a problem.

If any of that sounds dirty to you, and completely counter to everything that we stand for, it’s time to get your head out of the dark recesses of your ass and see the world for what it is. Because justice and decency are only as good as their domestic projections. They win elections, they don’t win wars, nor do they have any place in foreign policy when it comes to global interests.

This is the game we’re now playing, and it’s time that Canadians got used to it. We did our bit in the Great Wars, that was all well and good, but times change. We can no longer fall back on the past to comfort ourselves with regards to what now must be done and the ugliness that we must be willing to embrace to see it accomplished.

We live in a free country and have an all-volunteer army. If our elected officials send those volunteers into harms way, it only stands to reason that some of them are going to come home in boxes. The hard reality facing Canadians is the differentiation between casting those deaths in some wholly romantic and patriotic light, or one that represents the reality that they were ordered into action to kill and therefore run the risk of being killed. But, most importantly – to kill.

That must, at the end of the day, be the goal. And it is here that the hard, cold mathematics of warfare have to be applied and seen for what they are. If ten Canadian deaths mean the deaths of 100 Taliban fighters, or those civilians that support them, then it was worth it. During the Second World War, those sorts of numbers would have been cause for celebration. In this case, being that we are engaged in a global war against terrorism, its primary front being in Afghanistan, it only stands to reason that they should be cause for celebration as well. Of course, the loss of any of our fighting men and women is always terrible, but that’s what soldiers are ultimately for, is it not? If our government orders them into a situation in which they are to kill an enemy, then it only stands to reason that their role is accept death as a consequence. Despite what many might believe, especially given that we haven’t been involved in a serious conflict for generations, that’s the reality of the combat soldier. They are tools with which to kill and be killed in turn. If that were not the case, then they would not be trained to kill because simple logic dictates that when you’re profession is to go to war and kill others, your own death is something that might also come with the package.

So here we are, on the raggedy edge.

In today’s Toronto Star, Eric Margolis makes some interesting points about the recent Manley Report. His first criticism I found to be particularly well put…

“The report on Afghanistan delivered Monday by the Manley panel was deeply disappointing. Its totally predictable findings could have been written without the panel of instant Afghan experts wasting millions of tax dollars.”

Margolis’ assertion in that paragraph should not be overlooked, no matter your position on Canada’s role in Afghanistan. The report, despite its goals, produced very little in the way of constructive criticism. While some have claimed the report unbiased and critical of a variety of different positions, I must admit that I also agree with Margolis’ follow-up paragraph…

“This whitewash was designed to provide political cover for the Harper government, which has hung its hat on the failing war in Afghanistan, and provide it an escape hatch if the kabob hits the fan. It’s the latest example of the Liberals pathetic failure to demand Ottawa answer tough questions about the mess in Afghanistan.”

There are, of course, those that view the report as proof positive that we are currently engaged in a conflict against an enemy bent on the complete suppression of a people. I’ll not argue the fact that the Taliban’s ideology is entirely dangerous and counter to those principles that I, personally, hold dear, but it must also be said that its resurgence since the occupation of that country cannot wholly be aligned with the support of the group’s ideology, but rather support for the group’s desire to see foreign occupiers dispelled and their ability to put that desire into practice. There are currently some 2 million displaced Pashtuns along the Pashtun belt that have helped bolster the Taliban’s numbers, many of them simply reacting to the dire circumstances that they have found themselves in and willing to fight because the pay offered them is, in comparison to the Afghan army, considerably more.

This is also, of course, where Afghan history comes into play, and it is something that should not be conveniently overlooked. It is important to remember that the current government of Afghanistan is, in many ways, a Western proxy, and that its survival depends on Western intervention. To some, that fact is entirely relatable to the proxy government backed by the Soviets in the 70’s, which led to over a decade of armed struggle against them and their Afghan allies. During that period, Islamic radical groups were funded by the likes of the United States, largely using the Pakistani ISI as a conduit, many of whom would go on to form the Taliban.

Pakistan, then under the governance of the now assassinated Benazir Bhutto, supported the Taliban’s crusade to control the country after the defeat of the Soviets primarily because it viewed such backing as way in which to see Afghanistan become a Pakistani satellite state. It was because of this that Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan’s current President, broke faith with the Taliban, whom he himself once supported, resulting in his decision to work to reinstate Zahir Shah, the last Afghan King, which he did, rather ironically, while in exile in Pakistan (of all places).

Unfortunately, as is always the case, the people became the true victims of regional political designs, resulting in the implementation of a government that was dramatically fundamentalist and wholly without regard for basic human rights. But it should also not be overlooked that when the Taliban regime was publicly executing women in football stadiums for crimes that any civilized person would consider utterly ridiculous, the West, Canada included, did not act.

It is here that the most important aspect of the current Afghan adventure must be mentioned – the luxury of pretext.

Without the pretext provided by September 11th, the United States would have never used outright military force against the Taliban regime. They may have, at some point, funneled monies into supporting the Northern Alliance, whom they employed as a proxy force during the 2001 invasion, and may even have undertaken covert operations to kill or capture Osama Bin Laden, whom they were after because of the embassy bombings in Africa, but it must not be forgotten that prior to 9/11 a lucrative pipeline deal that would have seen a US based company granted the rights to its construction from the Caspian coast in Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan to the Pakistani coast was in the works, and that the cooperation of the Taliban regime was required to make it happen. Again, it is not wholly beyond the realm of possibility that the US might have attempted to covertly destabilize the Taliban were they to refuse their support, but what is of vastly greater importance is the reality that were the Taliban to have supported the initiative, and September 11th not occurred, the United States would most likely have played ball with them.

Back To ‘The People’

From a domestic perspective, our role in Afghanistan has been painted as one that is crucial to ensure the simplest of freedoms to the Afghan people – be it schooling, women’s rights, or the ability to freely participate in electing a representative government. And while these are truly noble causes, there is a darker side to our involvement, even to ISAF’s involvement, that must not be overlooked. That when the time comes that Afghanistan is finally secured, and at this point there is no way of knowing when that will be, the people of Afghanistan, and their government, will find themselves beholden to foreign powers. Of course, those simple freedoms fought for and secured will be in place, but so will a continued resentment amongst a percentage of the population regarding foreign influencing and the entirely inevitable economic exploitation of the country. Given that those primarily involved in operations in Afghanistan are members of the G8 and entirely supportive of globalization, it only stands to reason that Afghanistan will find itself flooded with foreign entities bent on exploiting it. Of course, given their new found freedoms and stability, not to mention the fact that Afghanistan is a nation in which most live on $2 dollars or less a day, the introduction of foreign investment will be welcomed and, as is usually the case in the beginning, hailed for its vision and commitment to the growth of the country’s economy, which is currently almost non-existent. The truth, unfortunately, is that the majority of that investment will not, as is always the case, benefit the people themselves, who will eventually come to realize that they have simply traded one form of oppression for another.

Obviously there is a massive difference between living in a nation governed by fanatical religious zealots and enduring the exploitative practices of the world’s wealthiest nations in exchange for the insurance of basic freedoms. But the question ultimately must be asked – why are those that have nothing, and most likely never will, routinely forced to choose between the lesser of two evils?

If Afghanistan is to be for Afghans, then our intentions must be plainly and unequivocally stated – that our role in Afghanistan at present is not to reap the rewards of an outcome that will benefit us and others. That we will adamantly oppose the exploitation of that country given our role in securing those freedoms for its people that we have used as justification for being there. And that we will never endeavor to take advantage of the sacrifice of those who have given their lives in that pursuit to line the pockets of already wealthy Canadian business people.

Power To Truth

That said; there are innumerable complexities regarding the current state of affairs in Afghanistan that obviously come before predictions of any post-war reality.

Margolis continues…

“Ottawa’s rash blunder into a tribal civil war in Afghanistan, and one-sided policy in the Mideast, have put Canada squarely in the gun sights of violent anti-western groups, and make it appear an eager spear carrier in the Bush/Cheney wars in the Muslim world. Every bombed Afghan village breeds new enemies for Canada.

Ottawa is hiding the full truth about Afghanistan from Canadians. Our flag-waving media has further obscured the facts.

When did we last see a report filed from the side of the Taliban and its growing number of allies?

The report’s claim that Afghanistan’s U.S.-imposed regime is “democratic” is absurd. CIA “asset” Hamid Karzai was installed by Washington and is kept in power by U.S. troops and a stream of cash payoffs to drug-dealing tribal chiefs. His rigged “election” was supervised by U.S. troops and bought with $100 bills.

Afghanistan’s so-called “national army” is made up of U.S.-paid mercenaries. The “army” does not need more training, as Manley claims. It needs loyalty to a legitimate national government — which does not exist.

Half of Afghanistan’s population, the Pashtun tribes (source of Taliban), has been largely excluded from political power. Until included, there will be no stability, never mind democracy.

Ominously, the war is spreading into Pakistan. Canada is backing Musharraf’s dictatorship in Pakistan while claiming to be fighting for “democracy” in Afghanistan.

The report soft-soaped government corruption. It ignored the 800-lb. gorilla in Kabul: Senior government officials up to their turbans in the heroin trade. Canada, the U.S. and NATO find themselves patrons of the world’s leading narcostate, which supplies 90% of the world’s heroin and runs on drug money.

The drugs are exported through Pakistan, another key western ally. Taliban eliminated the drug trade before being overthrown.

Most important, Manley’s report completely ignored the biggest problem of all. Canada has no political objective in this aimless war beyond making high-ranking Ottawa officials feel self-important at NATO meetings.

The Karzai regime, which rules only Kabul, would not last a week without western troops. There is no prospect of national political consensus until the Taliban and its allies are brought into the process. The reborn Afghan Communist Party is again a dominant influence in Kabul, including running torture prisons to which Canada had, until recently, been sending captives.

Canada is not being ennobled by this sordid, ugly, drug-fueled war. Its honour and reputation are being injured, its security endangered.

The Manley report is the political equivalent of a subprime mortgage. It does the nation a disservice.”

To many, our role in Afghanistan is a very black and white affair. That we are there to defeat a fascist movement bent on plummeting that nation back into darkness. Of course, it’s not as cut and dry as that, no matter how much we’d like to believe that it is. For every action there is a reaction, and Afghanistan is no exception to that rule. In fact, it is the rule.

Endgames

It’s at this point that I am routinely asked what I believe the solution to the problem to be. With regards to conflict as a whole, there is no easy answer to that question, or at least none that anyone wants to hear, save those that possess the blackest of dispositions.

Were one to look at this situation from a purely military standpoint, one without restriction, which is, in truth, the true nature of warfare, then the answer is quite simple, and one first employed by General Thomas J. Jackson after viewing the sacking of Fredericksburg proper by Union forces…

Kill ‘Em All

For those that enjoy employing the term ‘Islamofacism’ and delighting at the quips of individuals such as William Kristol, then I am sure this solution will be particularly favoured.

Despite the fact that we like to think of ourselves as wholly honourable with regards to our conduct in previous wars, the truth is that we are masters at employing overwhelming force to crush those that oppose us. Unfortunately, war is not something that can actually be undertaken with a conscience, as was proven in Vietnam. Had the United States employed severe, and, under the auspices of the Geneva Conventions, illegal methods, they would have made far greater progress than they ultimately did.

For example. During Vietnam, South Koreans were known for their exceptional ruthlessness, in some cases employing the most unconscionable, disgusting, yet effective practices when it came to dealing with the Vietcong. On several occasions they simply entered villages and killed everyone in them, thus ensuring that civilian support for the Vietcong and potential recruits were eliminated along with those in the village that acted as informants and so forth. They were so effective at counterinsurgency operations that they actually became widely feared by the Vietcong, who adopted a standing rule never to engage them unless absolutely necessary or outright victory was a foregone conclusion.

Were the same mentality employed in Afghanistan and suspect areas of Pakistan, you would no doubt see results. Of course, that would require the outright elimination of those civilians that act as a support mechanism for the Taliban, not to mention dealing with the millions of Pashtun refugees from which the Taliban draws some of its strength. In short, such factors would have to be systematically eliminated without regard, and with whatever means are available to us short of the employment of nuclear weapons.

It would probably quadruple the monthly cost of the war, if nor more, but at the same time end the conflict in a much shorter period of time.

True, the terrain is difficult and is to the Taliban’s advantage, but that’s precisely why BLU-82’s exist. While expensive, and logistically more difficult to deploy, one would imagine that they would be extremely lethal if used in large numbers. Then again, there are countless other bombs and remotely launched missiles that, if used in overbearing force, would make an impact as well. Given the satellite targeting technology available to us, we could simply go from grid to grid turning rocks in to pebbles, villages into craters, and people and animals into nothing more than blackened skeletons. At the same time, we would employ ground forces to move into those grids that have already been decimated to confront the survivors, and those remnants of the Taliban that have stumbled out of the hellish rubble, and eliminate them. Of course, to ensure maximum efficiency, we would have to make sure that we went about it in a random enough fashion so as not to allow the enemy to simply move from location to location, having figured out our targeting scheme. It would also require, at the very least, the deployment of some 500,000 combat troops.

The repercussions of such actions would be significant unfortunately, so we would also have to be prepared to deal with any segment of the Afghan population that endeavored to dissent against the use of such tactics, no matter their chosen method. Everyone from your average man on the street protesting the action to those willing to employ violence would have to be either jailed or eliminated. This would require the creation of a special until comprised of Afghans loyal to our cause overseen by Western commanders, all of whom would operate entirely off the books.

You want to win the war? Then fight it. Because in an asymmetric situation such as this, there is no comfortable middle ground.

Realism

Canada is currently one of only three nations involved in direct combat operations despite the fact that our contingent is smaller than numerous others that currently comprise ISAF. Our role in such operations is due to end in 2009, which means that if others are not willing to fill our role, then either we stay or adhere to the conditions of our original commitment.

If we leave, and despite how the current government or the Defense Ministry will attempt to paint it, those Canadians that lost their lives will have done so having done their duty as soldiers that were ordered by their government into harms way to do their job. The continuation of our presence based on our losses thus becomes nothing more than an act of attempting to ennoble the venture to cover the asses of those that were responsible for sending them into harms way in the first place, not to placate the overwhelming desire of Canadian forces to continue fighting and sustaining losses that are wholly disproportionate to those of the United Kingdom and the United States given the size of our contingent and theirs. The refusal of other ISAF members to engage in direct combat operations must also be taken into consideration, and again, not be used to justify our continued presence, but rather question why Canadian soldiers are good enough to be sacrificed while others are not.

If the answer is that we, as a nation, believe in waging war for the freedom of the Afghan people, then the methods that we are willing to employ must be reexamined. If not, Canadian forces could very well be in Afghanistan for another decade, costing this nation billions of dollars, and gifting this country’s historians a Vietnam of their very own.

I’m tired. Not a lot of sleep last night. I spent it in one of those semi-states of sleep, the sort where you’re aware that you have to be mindful of something that requires that you remain somewhat conscious but are still trying to sleep at the same time.

It’s clear and sunny here again today, as it has been this past week. In fact, it’s been uncommonly beautiful for this time of year, even given the chill the wind provides here on the West Coast that has the annoying ability to cut through everything that you’re wearing and go straight to your bones. We share that phenomenon with the UK, where it’s routine business as well.

I’m rambling, and I’m aware of it. I’m rambling because I’m having one of those mornings that I’m finding it difficult to concentrate. I’m having one of those mornings because, as has been the case over the last month, the list of things to touch upon grows so quickly every day that it seems almost impossible to retain it all and then translate it into something cogent.

Just off the top of my head there’s…

The recent revelation that the Canadian Armed Forces have stopped the transfer of prisoners to Afghan authorities because of a report of abuse on the 5th of November of last year despite the fact that last May, after a scandal broke regarding the Canadian transfer of prisoners to Afghan authorities that were known for their use of torture, the government claimed that it was taking steps to immediately rectify the situation.

The recently released Manley Report, which, although critical of numerous aspects of the mission in Afghanistan, has basically provided the government with what can only be viewed as a blank cheque with regards to Canadian combat operations in that country. Of course, the report is non-binding, but its ramifications on a political level are extremely convenient. Canada, of course, is only one of three nations involved in direct combat operations in Afghanistan, and of the three represents the smallest contingent. That being the case, our losses, compared to those of the United States and the UK, are wholly disproportionate. The debate, however, remains transfixed on our continued support of the mission’s objectives, to help stabilize the nation and provide it security, even though other members of ISAF, with considerably larger forces in country, continue to refuse to have their contingents involved in direct combat operations. There is also the concern that even though our efforts are aimed at ensuring democratic stability in Afghanistan, that its implementation is, in effect, the representation of Western regional aspirations, and therefore not dissimilar to Soviet regional aspirations in the 70’s when the USSR was responsible for aiding in the supplanting of a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. Thus, the real test of Afghan democracy will come when the nation has been secured and Western exploitative practices begin in earnest.

That is certainly not to say that the Taliban should be allowed to run rampant and plunge the nation into complete chaos, only that precluding the possibility of negotiations for the purposes of resolution is counter productive. Ultimately, there are always going to be those that support some, if not all, of the Taliban’s agenda, which raises a very important question: must those that do be wholly eliminated before progress can be made? And if they are not, what assurances do we have that there will not be a resurgence in the future that could seriously threaten the stability of the country, even after it possesses a well trained and equipped military? Given that, is it not fair to say that Western military involvement, on even the smallest of levels, will be required in Afghanistan for years to come?

Of course, all of that doesn’t even touch on the realities of the Pakistani frontier and the support covertly supplied those in opposition to the current Afghan government by elements within the Pakistani military establishment itself.

The possibility that Kenya could explode at any moment despite last minute attempts at political reconciliation aimed at stemming violence. As it stands now, the country is already in the early stages of a humanitarian crisis and also on the cusp of what could quickly turn into a genocidal event.

The recent disparity of global markets.

The continuing unrest in Pakistan.

The case of Canadian Guantanamo detainee Omar Khadr, who has been held at the facility since 2002. Khadr was captured at the age of 15 and, as the French Foreign Ministry recently pointed out…

“…all children associated with an armed conflict should be treated accordingly. As a minor at the time of the events, Mr. Khadr must be given special treatment — a point on which there is a universal consensus.”

The Canadian government has refused to intercede in Khadr’s case.

Gaza. While many have taken to illegally entering Egypt so that they can attempt to get food, fuel, and other sundries, Israel’s position remains steadfast, that being that the blockade is a move against the continued rocket attacks emanating from Gaza into Israel. The majority of the United Nations Security Council has labeled the blockade a violation of international humanitarian law and a collective punishment against the entire population, but the United States refuses to support that position without the inclusion of language that supports Israel’s concerns regarding the actions of Palestinian militants. Caught in the middle are, as usual, the 1.5 million residents of Gaza itself.

The firing of Linda Keen, President of The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, hours before she was to appear before a House committee in Ottawa. Keen was fired, according to Federal Natural Resources Minister Gary Lunn, due to the government’s ‘lack of confidence in her leadership’. This, of course, happened after the Commission’s attempt to have the Chalk River facility closed due to safety concerns and government’s decision to ignore the Commission.

The realities of the sanctions against Iran.

The ruinous economic reality of America’s imperialist adventures.

The frightening resurgence of Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz.

Media attacks on Heath Ledger following his death.

The Jose Padilla affair.

The continued humanitarian crisis unfolding in Somalia.

The Sudanese government’s decision to make Musa Hilal, a man accused of coordinating the Janjiweed militias in Darfur, an advisor to Federal Affairs Minister Abdel Basit Sabderat.

And So Forth

In truth, that’s just the tip of the iceberg. Iraq is, of course, absent – primarily recent events in Baquba - as is the ever-evolving telecommunications scandal in the US and the Sibel Edmonds affair, the unrest in Zimbabwe, and events in Chiapas.

Last, but certainly not least, there are also those voices that tend to make excellent arguments on a routine basis, such as Robert Fisk, Stephen Zunes, and (for your viewing pleasure), the always brilliant Chalmers Johnson…

Life is getting better. Our people on the ground see it every day, according to the likes of the Foreign Affairs Minister and our military’s top General. Our mission in Afghanistan is, according to them, of paramount importance. Of course, there is a schism between the two realities – helping reconstitute a nation or representing the third largest active combat force in the country that has suffered, in comparison to their counterparts, significantly more fatalities when the size of each force is taken into account.

This is the media lie that Canadians are confronted with on a daily basis. That we are in Afghanistan doing humanitarian works rather than primarily focusing on combating the Taliban. There are those that claim that it’s the same thing, that by working to defeat the Taliban insurgency we will ultimately provide the stability required to see the country lifted from the depths of the terrible poverty and darkness that has engulfed it for so long. Unfortunately, there are two problems with that line of thinking.

The Taliban has only grown in strength and continues to diversify its operations with regards to actions taken against foreign forces. It is a movement that occupies entirely familiar terrain, terrain that has trapped and destroyed foreign armies dating back to the 19th century. Despite our overwhelming conventional advantages, we are still unable to defeat a force that is armed with little more than RPG’s, mortars, and Kalashnikovs. As has been the case in the past, Afghan Guerrilla’s retain a vital advantage over us, perhaps the most important of all advantages – their belief in what they are fighting for and their willingness to sacrifice themselves for it (unlike occupational forces, the majority of whom have no desire to perish). Throughout history that has always been the advantage of the Guerrilla, and it is no different in this case. Only negotiations will ultimately end hostilities, and for that to occur, external influences will have to abandon their puppetry of the government in Kabul.

The second problem is Afghanistan’s ability to possess a stable economy without the existence of the poppy trade, which overwhelmingly constitutes the nation’s largest gross national product. True, as a conduit for gas and oil projects in neighbouring countries, Afghanistan is entirely vital, but then, who will ultimately benefit from the exploitation of Afghanistan in that regard? Certainly not ordinary Afghans, the majority of whom subside on $2 dollars US (or less) a day. Given who currently has their meet-hooks firmly in the backs of the country’s ruling body, the chances of the government nationalizing anything to do with that sector is about as probable as pigs growing wings, and Afghanistan’s current President, who was once a shill for Unocal, knows that only too well.

Beyond that there is the very likely probability that the country will be exploited by international trans-corporations (such as Coca Cola) because of the ability to maintain low wages and not offer benefits, such as medical coverage. Yes, women will ultimately be freed from oppression, and, just as in countless other locations around the world, they too will be able to work for peanuts a day alongside their male counterparts. As for the rest, foreign contractors will reap the benefits of everything to do with reconstruction to the distribution of aid.

Like Iraq, corruption is rife in Afghanistan, as a recent Oxfam report details…

“Too much aid to Afghanistan is wasted — soaked up in contractors’ profits, spent on expensive expatriate consultants or squandered on small-scale, quick-fix projects, a leading British charity said on Tuesday.

Despite more than $15 billion of aid pumped into Afghanistan since U.S.-led and Afghan forces toppled the Taliban in 2001, many Afghans still suffer levels of poverty rarely seen outside sub-Saharan Africa.

“The development process has to date been too centralised, top-heavy and insufficient,” said a report by Oxfam.

By far the biggest donor, the United States approved a further $6.4 billion in Afghan aid this year, but the funds are spent in ways that are “ineffective or inefficient”, Oxfam said.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocates close to half its funds to the five largest U.S. contractors in Afghanistan.

“Too much aid is absorbed by profits of companies and sub-contractors, on non-Afghan resources and on high expatriate salaries and living costs,” the report said.

A full-time expatriate consultant can cost up to $500,000 a year, Oxfam said.

More money needed to be channelled through the Afghan government, strengthening its influence and institutions.

Aid also needed to be better coordinated to avoid duplication, it said.

Only 10 percent of technical assistance to Afghanistan is coordinated either with the government or among donors.

Spending on development is dwarfed by that spent on fighting the Taliban. The U.S. military is spending $65,000 a minute in Afghanistan, Oxfam said.

The report called for the 25 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) run by the armies of 13 different nations across the country to withdraw where the security situation is stable enough and carry out relief work only where there is a critical need.

The PRTs, Oxfam said, “being nation-led are often driven more by available funding or the political interests of the nation involved rather than development considerations”. The result was “a large number of small-scale, short-term projects”.

“Given the historic suspicion of foreign intervention, such efforts to win ‘hearts and minds’ are naive. It is unsurprising that the huge expansion of PRT activities has not prevented the deterioration of security.”

Violent incidents are up at least 20 percent since last year, according to U.N. estimates, and have spread northwards to many areas previously considered safe.

More than 200 civilians have been killed in at least 130 Taliban suicide bombs and at least 1,200 civilians have been killed overall this year — about half of them in operations by Afghan and international troops.”

To the victors go the spoils. In the age of globalization, that includes nations that have been invaded and in which proxy governments have been instituted.

The truth, of course, is that prior to 9/11 a US based company was in the midst of negotiating with the Taliban to allow the construction of a natural gas pipeline through it. We will most assuredly see that project come to fruition in the future if the status quo remains, not to mention a host of other exploitative ventures that will see the people of Afghanistan used while, at the same time, being convinced that it’s for their own good. Given Afghanistan’s history, how long do you think it would be before Afghans called a spade a spade and armed groups in the mountains began to reappear again?

In the last entry I made about the practice of waterboarding, it was pointed out that the technique has been used in the past in the training of US special forces. The purpose of its role in their training being to help them resists interrogation by way of torture. From an article in today’s Independent entitled Waterboarding is torture - I did it myself, says US advisor, comes the following paragraph…

“In a further embarrassment for Mr Bush yesterday, Malcolm Nance, an advisor on terrorism to the US departments of Homeland Security, Special Operations and Intelligence, publicly denounced the practice. He revealed that waterboarding is used in training at the US Navy’s Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape School in San Diego, and claimed to have witnessed and supervised “hundreds” of waterboarding exercises. Although these last only a few minutes and take place under medical supervision, he concluded that “waterboarding is a torture technique – period”.

Tomorrow is Remembrance Day. Like many other Canadian families, members of my own participated in the war – my grandfather and two great uncles. On the 11th of November we remember the sacrifices made by those that fought in the major wars of the last century, the most devastating and globally impacting of those being the Second World War.

During that war, both the Japanese and the Gestapo, the German secret police, employed the practice of waterboarding. At its conclusion, those guilty of such practices were tried for war crimes. At that time, the United States considered the practice to be torture.

Given the gravity of what tomorrow represents, I find it reprehensible that a debate about this subject even exists and that the practice is even employed. If anything, the actions of the United States and its allies in the War On Terror, Canada included, demonstrates that when you are the victors of one of the world’s greatest conflicts, it’s easy to write the rules of condemnation and, at the same time, dismiss them when they are applicable to yourself – no matter how much time has passed.

We are not afforded the luxury to mourn the fallen tomorrow and, at the same time, claim that times have changed and that the morality and sacrifice that we reverently observe on November 11th cannot be tarnished by the employment of practices that are entirely counter to the hopes of those that laid down their lives. To do so not only dishonours them; but renders their sacrifice, and the belief that it helped protect something sacred, moot.

We are arrogant; there is no denying that. Our crimes are not crimes because we are the judge and jury of the world. To admit to criminality is to admit that that which we promote as the pinnacle of civility is little more than a fraud – which it most certainly, and always has, been. In the end, given the existence of places such as Guantanamo, of secret Black Sites, of what has occurred at prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the practice of Rendition, we have become no better than those that our now celebrated dead once fought to wipe from the face of the earth.

Perhaps that is why we cling to the past, to the remembrance of those that fell. Perhaps, somewhere sleeping within us, we still realize that the true purpose of their sacrifice was to ensure that we, the people, retained the right to ensure that such things could never be done in our name, that we remained free from that which gripped the world all those years ago – fascism.

Make no mistake, fascism is not an ideology that is limited to set parameters. Given the right conditions it can rise in even the most liberal of nations. In truth, its seeds grow far faster, and far less recognized, in such soil. The belief that decency and greatness resides at the core of a society is precisely what it requires to flourish, for only then can it be justified in times of fear, uncertainty, and strife. It is only where the free can be convinced to give up their freedoms that the specter of fascism can be found. It is only when those that profess to champion justice, equality, and liberty turn to the employment of torture that the roots of fascism begin to take hold.

Sixty-two years ago the Second World War ended. At its conclusion, more lives were lost in those short years than at any other point in human history. During that war, men of this nation, and others, fought against a global tyranny that threatened those principles that we now claim to champion. Therefore, tomorrow our duty is not wholly to remember the individuals that sacrificed themselves for the continued existence of those principles, but the principles themselves. And in doing so, we should be ashamed that we have allowed them to be tarnished, that we have become apathetic with regards to their execution, and that we have wrapped ourselves in our own mythology to such an extent that we have almost become unfamiliar with what they represent.

This is not a nation under one God. It is a nation in which its people have the right to worship whatever God they chose knowing that church and state remain separate. This is a nation in which the colour of your skin, or your ethnic background, should not be cause for suspicion. It is one in which all people, no matter their background, come together to constitute what we call Canada.

But most of all – this is a nation. It is not a convenient military or political proxy for the benefit of others. It is not a nation that is so insignificant that it must bend to the will of greater powers to feel significant. This is a nation that, throughout the course of modern events, has more to be proud of than ashamed – and even then, one that should have the decency to address its misgivings and make amends.

It is time that the people of this country realized that, lest this not be a nation. For if we are incapable of that realization, then those that sacrificed themselves for it will be marginalized to the point of becoming little more than statues in park squares and in front of government buildings that are pointed to when the need arises to justify the diminishment of our freedoms rather than being symbols of why we possess them.

During that Q & A at last night’s event I was asked about the recent poll in which 78% of Afghans polled nationally believe that “things are generally going in the right direction”. Of course, when one reads that, and doesn’t delve any deeper analytically, it looks automatically fantastic, and to those that support our continued role in combat operations it is ‘proof positive’ that we’re succeeding.

1,758 individuals were questioned for the poll conducted by Environics. In Kandahar, where we are currently militarily focused, 15% of those polled said that they felt more secure. But asked if things in the same province were heading in the wrong direction, 34% of those polled responded that they felt less safe.

In other areas, including those regarding women’s rights and reconstruction, the poll was very positive, which is fantastic. But then again, it’s bound to be in areas that are militarily occupied by foreign forces. The question is, without their presence, what happens?

Now, some might see that as justification for our presence, but the reality is that we cannot remain there forever ensuring that atmosphere. At some point we will have to come to terms with the fact that the government and the Taliban will have to enter into negotiations, and that is where things become interesting with regards to the poll.

85% of Afghans believe that the government should negotiate with the Taliban, with 72% saying that a coalition government with the Taliban would be acceptable. And while one in three believe that the Taliban would return to power were foreign forces to pull out before the armed forces and police were better trained, the exact same ratio also believes that suicide bombings are sometimes justified – a rather odd juxtaposition.

These numbers are interesting in that while the government has made overtures with regards to negotiations, the Taliban has responded by saying that it will not enter into them unless foreign forces leave the country and the possibility of the implementation of Shiria law is not automatically discounted. Thus, to some extent, those polled realize that give and take will be required for government to function. It is also interesting to note that while those polled believe that the police and armed forced require more training to ensure that the Taliban can’t militarily reassume power, a vast majority support the creation of a coalition government.

This is where things get sticky, and, in truth, have nothing to do with independent Afghan objectives. Given that the existence of Karzai’s government is entirely dependent on foreign assistance, those that have helped institute his government will, of course, want to play a key role in any negotiations held with the Taliban, placing Karzai in a very limited position. The fact remains that the West does not really want the Taliban involved in government, knowing full well that theirs is a movement that is not limited to Afghanistan alone but parts of Pakistan as well. The fact remains, if Afghanistan is to move forward as a sovereign state, it must have the ability to conduct its affairs without foreign interference, but that has real risks as it pertains to the nation’s future. Thus, we find ourselves full circle.

Both the current government of Afghanistan and the Taliban receive support from outside of the country itself. Pashtun refugees and sympathetic militants in Waziristan bolster the Taliban’s numbers while the Afghan government relies massively on occupational forces for its survival. Both also receive funding from parties dedicated to their survival.

The ANA’s leadership is replete with ex-UIF commanders, with much of the UIF’s strength having been absorbed into the ANA following the 2001 invasion. This raises questions, of course, being that UIF fighters are not wholly inexperienced, having fought the Taliban during their rise to power in the 90’s. They were also used as a proxy force by the United States during the initial invasion of Afghanistan as well. Thus, to claim that the ranks of the ANA are in dire need of military training assistance is somewhat curious. If anything, the problem lies in their income, which is significantly lower than that paid Taliban fighters. Ideology also plays a role as well. Like the Taliban, the UIF spent a considerable amount of time attempting to gain control of the country itself. Overcome by the Taliban in the late 90’s, they were forced to carry out significantly diminished operations because of their limited position. That said; the creation of a coalition government would most certainly see internal military struggles arise, not to mention clashes between those members of the current government that are ex-UIF and their Taliban counterparts.

The reality of Afghan reconciliation is immensely complex primarily because throughout its history it has never actually occurred on a truly national level. Beyond the economic and military questions that currently plague it, the country is home to Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, Aimak, Baloch, with just over 9% of the remainder of the population being comprised of smaller groups. Throughout its history it has been a crossroads of conflict and conquest, having been thusly influenced by the Median and Persian Empires, the Kushans, Hepthalites, Arabs, Turks, Mongols, British, and Russians. Following the defeat of the Soviets in the late 80’s, the turmoil that gripped the nation as a whole was disastrous, with even the Taliban regime not fully in control of the country as a whole following their ascent to power. After 9/11, and the subsequent invasion of the country, that turmoil became the business of the United States and its allies, including Canada. Thus, we now find ourselves in a position of trying to solve a puzzle that is actually older than the nation that we inhabit.

So what is to be done and what role should Canada play in Afghanistan’s future? Like numerous examples of foreign military interference in the latter half of the 20th century, we find ourselves in the position of having become part of a mess that we now believe we must clean up. Unfortunately, we have historical precedent working against us, which is something that should never be disregarded when it comes to such matters. In fact, it shouldn’t have been prior to our agreement to enter into combat operations in the first place. That lack of foresight rests with those in government and at the head of our military that, I would assume, couldn’t find the time to pick up a book and do some reading about what it was they were getting us into. Being that our initial role was to provide security in Kabul and work to help reconstitute its infrastructure, it cannot be overlooked that our use in direct military operations emerged from the reallocation of US assets with regards to the invasion of Iraq. As it stands now, the Germans have more military personnel in Afghanistan, and yet they do not operate in a combat capacity. Thus, there obviously is a distinct difference between providing security in areas in which reconstitution is occurring and overt military operations.

A confidential media source with knowledge of meetings between Canadian officials and the US Department of Defense recently told me that during a meeting prior to the invasion of Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld made it quite clear that it was expected of us to participate in combat operations. Such pressures, though commonly only suspected by many that comment on this issue, provide evidence that the US invasion of Iraq, and the reallocation of US assets from the Afghan theatre, was an overwhelming factor in Canada assuming a far more directed combat role. It was at this juncture that public confusion began with regards to our involvement in Afghanistan, the redirection of our involvement skewed by the government to make it seem as though the status of our mission there had not been significantly altered.

If some 2,500 Canadians are being leaned on as the third largest foreign combat force in the country, questions have to be asked as to why, especially given the size of other contingents. The reason is that we agreed to allow our forces to be used in open combat operations against the Taliban where others have not, and have thus paid a hefty price for it. There are over 3,000 German military personnel in Afghanistan, but the German government refuses to allow them to be used in open combat operations against the Taliban insurgency. The Italians have over 2,000 and the same rule applies.

We are currently under British command and operating directly against the Taliban insurgency in Regional Command South. We are joined there by, as previously mentioned - the British, as well as the Americans, Australians, Estonians, Romanians, and Danes. Next to the British and Americans, our fighting force outnumbers the entire commitment of Estonia, Romania, and Denmark by more than 1,400, with most of them also having personnel committed elsewhere that still factor into that number. The Australians stationed in Kandahar number proximately 110, but operate in logistical, command, and liaison capacities only. So, the short of it is that we provide the third largest military contingent being used to fight the Taliban.

Since the 2001 invasion of the country, the British, who have some 6,700 troops on the ground at present, have lost 82 soldiers. Since 2002, Canada, with some 2,500 troops, has lost 71, the majority of those occurring after our relocation to Kandahar. In comparison, the United States, who instituted the invasion of the country, has lost just under 260 soldiers in hostile action.

Given the size of the Canadian contingent – you do the math. In six years of occupation and fighting we have lost approximately one fourth the number of soldiers than the nation that initiated the invasion in the first place, the very same that has used us to, in essence, bolster their flank while they went on a reckless venture elsewhere. Thus, it would seem that the German government is somewhat smarter than most, or at least can see a spade for what it is.

How many Canadian lives are we prepared to lose fighting a guerrilla force in an asymmetric situation? It’s obvious that despite our overwhelming conventional firepower that their resolve is not going to be broken – they’ve demonstrated as much for decades. Of course, there are those that will argue that we are fighting terrorism itself, and that by being in Afghanistan we are deterring terrorism from reaching our shores. To those that actually believe such fantasy, remember that the British Home Office concluded that the four men responsible for the London Bombings carried out the attacks having used information from the web to design the bombs used, and that no direct connection with al-Qaeda was ever established. Further, that their motive was probably one geared more towards their outrage with regards to British foreign policy and the xenophobic realities they faced in England post 9/11, if not before.

Helping bring Afghanistan into a new era in which it can look to securing itself, healing its divisions, and progressing is not something that I am opposed to. But it is something that is impossible if we are to insist that the outcome be one that we are entirely comfortable with. Until such a mindset is disregarded in favour of entertaining other options, real progress will not be made in Afghanistan, only the appearance of it. That must be Canada’s primary role in Afghanistan – to spearhead the alteration of such an understanding and work towards a national reconciliation that may very well produce very real challenges, but ones that are Afghanistan’s to navigate and overcome. Only then will Afghanistan be truly Afghan.

As expected, both the Bloc and the NDP will not support the Throne Speech, leaving it up to the Liberals, who are in a state of national disarray, to decide if a federal election is to be called or not. Personally, I don’t think the Liberals will bite, though stranger things have happened.

One of the most important aspects of the speech was the government’s assertion that Canadian military participation in Afghanistan last until 2011, claiming that objectives within the country should be reached by then – the foremost being the training of the Afghan military and police. Interestingly, much of the Afghan military’s command infrastructure is comprised of ex-Northern Alliance leaders who have experience in such matters, leaving one wondering why their expertise isn’t enough given that they’ve spent years involved in that nation’s ongoing conflicts. Perhaps it’s simply a matter of financial support, or the use of our forces, and others that comprise ISAF, in an attempt to degrade the Taliban to a point where the Afghan army can handle them. Of course, the Taliban have only gained in strength since they were all too easily overthrown in 2001, and are currently displaying the sort of guerrilla based fortitude that has defeated foreign occupiers in Afghanistan for more than a century. Thus, in a purely military sense, will four years make a difference? Will ten?

There is a reason why Hamid Karzai’s government has made overtures of late to the Taliban’s leadership regarding their participation in the political process – it’s because historical precedent does not favour current policy and the inclusion of foreign powers in its execution. There will come a time when either the government of Afghanistan will have to yield to some of the Taliban’s demands or look to those currently occupying the nation to alter their tactics drastically and undertake operations bent on the systematic annihilation of the Taliban and its support networks, civilian or otherwise, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as such overtly brutal tactics are the only way that conventional forces can successfully deal with an asymmetric situation.

No matter the government’s assertion in the Throne Speech, make no mistake, Canadians remain involved in combat operations, and are, by no means, limited to training operations - something that was not mentioned in the speech, and for obvious reasons. The government’s entire focus on Canadian involvement in Afghanistan was cast in the simplest and cleanest of lights, completely disregarding both historical precedents and the fact that the enemy now being fought has only grown and diversified despite the efforts of ISAF to counter them.

The bottom line is that 2011 will turn into 2015 and so on. To deal with the situation we have to be willing to look at the regional realities involved, at the complicity of elements within Pakistan, even within aspects of the Pakistani military itself. Ultimately, like it or not, a decision has to be made regarding the military situation as it applies to ISAF; that either the mission is altered and overwhelming, unrelenting force is used to combat those now being fought, including the civilian apparatuses that support it, or diplomacy is employed to bring those Afghan elements involved to the table in hopes of an agreement being reached. That will, unfortunately, not occur, until the foreign occupation of the country is either ended or severely limited – something that the government of Afghanistan and its Western backers will never agree to. And so, like numerous powers before us, we may very well find ourselves in a protracted conflict that will place us in a position of waiting for domestic pressure to end our involvement to become overwhelmingly popular. As to how many lives will be lost in the process, who can say.

Like Vietnam before it, Afghanistan is a nation that has been plagued by conflict for centuries. Thus, to think that a military solution is the most viable option with regards to securing a lasting peace is to simply repeat the mistakes of those that have come before us. The imposition of democracy is no different than the imposition of Communism – it is still an imposition at its core, and one that cannot realistically be expected to succeed in such short a period without key roles being played by the nation’s various groups.

Obviously security is an issue, but it must be one that is overseen by an impartial entity, such as a newly constituted UN commanded force that is put in place for the sake of ensuring stability while diplomatic avenues are explored. The existence of an overwhelming Western military presence in the country is not going to be able to provide such an atmosphere, only project what is the current reality – that the government of Afghanistan is a construct of Western foreign policy designs and exists to placate them. Unfortunately, like it or not, not even democracy can be forced on a people, even if just a portion, without their consent and contribution to its institution. That is, I am afraid, the truth of the matter.

Beyond Afghanistan, the government declared the Kyoto Protocol a dead issue, outlined new crime legislation, and focused on the lowering of taxes.

The war in Afghanistan is, as many of you are aware, a touchy subject here at home. There are currently just over 2,000 Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan, with the British maintaining the largest foreign force next to that of the United States. In Iraq, the British currently have 5,500 troops, though it has just been announced that their numbers will be cut to 2,500 by next spring - a domestic political move on the part of the Brown government more than anything.

The Independent’s Patrick Cockburn asked in the paper’s October 6th edition - Why? Six years on from the invasion of Afghanistan, and his piece makes some very good points, ones that should resonate with many Canadians. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan remains a war almost out of mind, as if it were being waged on some distant planet and therefore not worth the effort to understand beyond the vastly simplified mantras that we have been fed by government and the media. Perhaps that’s why so many people have such a narrow view of not only what is transpiring there, but of the nation’s history and how it is resonating in the present…

“Six years after a war was launched to overthrow the Taliban, British solders are still being killed in bloody skirmishing in a conflict in which no final victory is possible. Tomorrow is the sixth anniversary of the invasion of Afghanistan by the US, Britain and allies, an operation codenamed Enduring Freedom. But six years on, Britain is once again, as in Iraq, the most junior of partners, spending the lives of its soldiers with little real influence over the war.

The outcome of the conflict in Afghanistan will be decided in Washington and Islamabad. There is no chance of defeating the Taliban so long as they can retreat, retrain and recoup in the mountain fastnesses of Pakistan.

Yesterday, we learned of the death of another British soldier. Although his identity has not been released, it is believed that the dead man acted as a mentor to Prince William. Two others were injured when their vehicle was caught by an explosion west of Kandahar, bringing the number of British soldiers killed in Afghanistan to 82 since 2001.

The drip-drip of British losses underlines how little has been achieved in the past six years, and how quickly any gains can be lost. Most of southern Afghanistan was safer in the spring of 2002 than it is now and at no moment during the years that have elapsed is there any evidence from the speeches of successive British ministers that they have much idea what we are doing there and what we hope to achieve.

This week, the Conservative leader David Cameron told supporters that he would restore Afghanistan to the “number one priority in foreign policy” . The remark highlighted how this conflict has all but slipped from the political agenda.

Yet, Afghanistan is filled with the bones of British soldiers who died in futile campaigns in the 19th century and beyond. The lesson of these long forgotten wars is that military success on the ground in Afghanistan is always elusive and, even when achieved, seldom turns into lasting political success.

The Taliban came to power in Afghanistan through Pakistani support and it was when this support was withdrawn in 2001 that the Taliban abandoned Kabul and Kandahar in the days and weeks after 7 October without a fight. But six years later, the Taliban are back.

The violence shows no sign of ending. Suicide bombings, gun battles, airstrikes and roadside bombs have killed 5,100 people in the first nine months of this year, a 55 per cent increase over the same period in 2006.

I went to Afghanistan in September 2001 a few days after 9/11 when it became obvious the US was going to retaliate by overthrowing the Taliban because they had been the hosts of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida.

It was a very peculiar war that followed, distinguished, above all, by a lack of real fighting. When Pakistani support and Saudi money were withdrawn, the Taliban’s regime unravelled at extraordinary speed. By early 2002, I was able to drive from Kabul to Kandahar without feeling that I was taking my life in my hands.

But, for all the talk of progress and democracy and the presence of thousands of British, American and other Nato troops on the ground, it is impossible to undertake such journeys across the country safely.

Yet, back in 2001, from the moment I saw the first American bombs falling on Kabul and the sparks of light from the feeble Taliban anti-aircraft guns, it was obvious the two sides were completely mismatched.

Taliban fighters who expected to be targeted, simply fled before they were annihilated. The victory came too easily. The Taliban never made a last stand even in their bastions of support in the Pashtun heartlands in south. It was a very Afghan affair in keeping with the traditions of the previous 25 years when sudden betrayals and changes of alliance, not battles, had decided the winner.

Driving from Kabul towards Kandahar in the footsteps of the Taliban, I visited the fortress city of Ghazni on the roads south where the Taliban had suddenly dematerialised and received a de facto amnesty in return for giving up power without a fight.

Qari Baba, the ponderous looking governor of Ghazni province, who had been appointed the day before, said: “I don’t see any Taliban here”, which was surprising since the courtyard in front of his office was crowded with tough-looking men in black turbans carrying sub machine-guns.

“Every one of them was Taliban until 24 hours ago,” whispered a Northern Alliance officer.

One fact that should have made the presence of British, American and other foreign troops easier in Afghanistan was that the Taliban were deeply hated for their cruelty, mindless religious fanaticism (leading to the banning of chess and kite flying) and the belief that they are puppets of Pakistani military intelligence. And unlike Iraq, the foreign presence in Afghanistan has had majority support, though that is slipping.

Drawing parallels between Iraq and Afghanistan is misleading because Saddam Hussein had sought to run a highly centralised state. In Afghanistan power had always been fragmented. But Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 were mired in poverty. One reason why both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein went down so quickly is that Afghans, like the Iraqis, hoped for a better life.

They did not get it. Lack of jobs and services like electricity, clean water, hospitals and food continued or got worse.

Iraq is potentially a rich country because of its oil wealth. In Afghanistan the only equivalent to oil money is the money from the poppy fields on which impoverished farmers increasingly depend. One of the reasons the Taliban lost the support of Pashtun farmers in 2001 – though this was hardly highlighted by the victors – is that they enforced a ban on poppy growing which was highly effective. If the US adopts a policy of killing the poppy plants by spraying them with chemicals from the air, then they will also be engulfed by the same wave of unpopularity. The opium trade is fuelling lawlessness, warlordism and an unstable state.

Both Afghanistan and Iraq are notoriously difficult countries to conquer. They have for centuries, been frontier zones where powerful neighbours have fought each other by proxy.

Victory in Afghanistan six years after the start of the war to overthrow the Taliban is not likely. Even massively expanding troop levels would just mean more targets, and more losses. Armies of occupation, or perceived occupation, always provoke a reaction.

Ultimately what happens in Afghanistan will be far more determined not by skirmishes in Helmand province, but by developments in Pakistan, the Taliban’s great supporter, which are wholly beyond British control. And the agenda in both the Afghan and Iraqi wars is ultimately determined by US domestic political needs Successes in faraway wars have to be manufactured or exaggerated. Necessary compromises are ruled out, leaving Iraqis and Afghans alike with the dismal outlook of war without end.”

First, according to the British polling agency ORB, its latest survey, conducted at 1,461 Iraqi households, suggests that civilian casualties during the four and a half years of conflict in Iraq could total more than 1 million. According to polling information, ORB asked residents “How many members of your household, if any, have died as a result of the conflict in Iraq since 2003?”. Then, based on the nation’s estimated number of households – some 4,050,597 – it concluded that the figure of 1.2 million was reasonable, with a 2.4% margin of error.

Neither the United States military, nor the Iraqi government, provides full civilian casualty counts, thus making the number hard to verify. US civilian casualty statistics are the lowest of any provided. There are other numerous, and widely conflicting, sources with regards to civilian deaths since the invasion in 2003, from The Lancet’s most recent study to that of Iraq Body Count.

Today’s Toronto Star featured an article by Chris Morris about a lawsuit being launched against the federal government by those affected by Agent Orange and Dioxin at Canadian Forces Base Gagetown following what they view as an inadequate, one time, $20,000 compensation package – one which Veterans Affairs claims is “ex gratia”, which ultimately means that the government is not taking official responsibility.

“People angry with Ottawa’s compensation package for Agent Orange exposure at Canadian Forces Base Gagetown are turning to a class-action lawsuit for satisfaction, says the lawyer handling the case.

Tony Merchant of the Merchant Law Group said Thursday his law offices across the country have been flooded with calls from people furious at the federal government’s offer of a one-time, $20,000 payment for those who meet strict eligibility requirements.

“It is ridiculously inadequate,” Merchant said in an interview from his Regina law office.

“It’s enough money to buy a used truck in exchange for what for many is daily pain and suffering. It’s not solving the problem for the government. It’s really drawing attention to the problem and making things worse.”

Merchant said hundreds of people have added their names to the class-action lawsuit, swelling its ranks to about 3,000 veterans and civilians. The law firm is seeking court approval for the case to go ahead in Manitoba and Newfoundland and Labrador.

Veterans Affairs Minister Greg Thompson said earlier this week the compensation will apply only to those who worked on or lived near the huge New Brunswick training base in 1966 and 1967 – the two years the U.S. military tested Agent Orange and several other combat defoliants for use in the Vietnam War.

Qualifying applicants also must have one of 12 disorders associated with Agent Orange exposure, including prostate cancer and type 2 diabetes.”

MatthewGood.org contributor Patrick Pitt will hopefully provide more insight into this matter in the days ahead.