International laws and the Geneva Conventions exist for a reason. One of them is to ensure that child soldiers cannot be treated as regular prisoners of war given their age. It is, beyond a shadow of a doubt, impossible for a twelve-year-old to seriously grasp the reality of what they’re doing when involved in military action. Were that not the case then armies the world over would be replete with conscripts and volunteers younger that 15 years of age. One need only study the defense of Berlin by both young girls and boys of the Hitler-Jugend indoctrinated by an entirely corrupted ideology to understand the reality of such usury. Children are malleable, eager to please, and rarely understand the gravity of such situations. On top that, they are a tool that is easily corrupted to carry out unspeakable horrors, as has been demonstrated in Africa and elsewhere. In fact, throughout history, children have been used in times of conflict even in cases in which the moral codes of societies deem it unacceptable.

That, of course, covers those that can technically be deemed child soldiers having been used as such by adults. When it comes to singular cases that are far more ambiguous, reality becomes even more warped.

How the United States was ever allowed to circumvent the Geneva Conventions with regards to the classification of child soldiers is beyond me. But the truth of the matter is that they did, and in the chaos that consumed Afghanistan after its invasion in 2001, the United States classified mere children as enemy combatants, claiming them terrorists and therefore beyond the protections of the Geneva Conventions. The most telling case is that of Mohammed Jawad, considered the youngest detainee to be sent to Guantanamo, who was taken into custody in December of 2002.

The day that Jawad was, for all intents and purposes, abducted, he spent it helping his uncle dig a well. After that he went to buy some tea. It would be the last time that his family would see him for seven years. He was, at the time, twelve, though according to a bone scan conducted when he arrived at Guantanamo the US military claimed that he was roughly seventeen. On top of that, during questioning, Jawad claimed that his father had died fighting the Soviets in the 80’s, which would make it impossible for him to have been twelve when he was detained. Lastly, birth certificates in Afghanistan are extremely rare, so determining Jawal’s age was next to impossible.

Of course, in the post 9/11 world that’s enough to warrant his detention as far as most are concerned. He was accused of throwing a grenade at a US army vehicle on the day of his arrest, injuring two US soldiers and an interpreter. He would later be charged with attempted murder after confessing to the crime at Bagram Air Base, a facility that has since been determined to be the location at which the introduction of systematic prisoner abuse began.

Jawal was initially arrested by local authorities who spoke Persian, meaning that he could barely understand them. Thus, after it was made clear to him that his family would be killed if he didn’t agree to place his thumbprint on a document, he was transported to Bagram and questioned further, which most likely means that he was interrogated and endured the employment of various techniques, even given his age. After his release, at the age of 19, Jawal confirmed that he had been tortured while in US custody. Records provided by the US military show that after a year at the facility he attempted to kill himself by repeatedly bashing his head against the wall of his cell.

In the end, after seven years of imprisonment, U.S. District Judge Ellen Huvelle found Jawal innocent of the charges, claiming the government’s case “riddled with holes”. Thus, Jawal was released this August and flown back to Afghanistan by the US military in shackles, despite the court’s ruling. Once he arrived, he was taken to meet with Hamid Karzai, who promised him money and a house. Even his own mother refused to believe that it was him until she was able to identify him by a mark on his head.

To this day, The Pentagon contends that Jawal is guilty, no matter the court’s ruling.

How we conduct ourselves is a reflection of who we are. If we are not that which we claim to be, then we are nothing. And if we are nothing, then the illegal detention of a child is excusable given that, in the end, it means that we are defending nothing. And if we are defending nothing, then all that we claim sacred is nothing more than the province of those become monsters.

October 28, 2009

When you invade a country like Afghanistan it’s always better to do it with inside help. Paying off such help, of course, is a crucial part if it – whether it be through financial considerations, arms, agreeing to look the other way regarding poppy production, or promises regarding positions within the country following said invasion.

When it comes to Afghanistan post 9/11, General Abdul Rashid Dostum remains one of the most troubling Northern Alliance commanders tapped by the United States during the 2001 invasion. Mistrusted by the CIA, even though he was reportedly on their payroll at the time, he would be responsible for the most egregious war crime to take place in post 9/11 Afghanistan – the Dasht-i-Leili massacre – which the Obama Administration has, eight years after the fact, ordered to be investigated. While Dostun is no longer a general in the Afghan army given his role in the kidnapping of Akbar Bai, he retains significant influence within the Afghan Uzbek community.

At the time of the invasion Dostum was one of three Northern Alliance commanders. Given the freedom afforded them during the early stages of the invasion, it was not uncommon for individuals such as Dostum to take advantage of the chaos of that environment. The transfer of prisoners to US authorities is one example of corrupted practices given that many of the individuals that were rounded up were innocent of any affiliation with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or any other such organization. In many cases it was simply a matter of placating the Americans with little regard as to who was actually innocent or not. In the case of the Dasht-i-Leili massacre, Dostum’s forces were transporting Talib fighters that had surrendered.

Abdul Rashid Dostum’s history reads like a bad John le Carré novel. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan he fought with Soviet forces (he was trained in the Soviet Union) against the Mujahideen, then backed by numerous nations including the United States. After the collapse of the USSR, the power struggle that consumed Afghanistan saw Dostum turn on his former President, the Soviet backed Mohammad Najibullah, and allied himself with the Mujahideen commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. In 1992, the two captured Kabul and remained allied so that they could deal with the forces of another military commander that had fought the Soviet occupation, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Two years later, Dostum would once again switch allegiances, allying himself with Hekmatyar against Ahmad Shah Massoud and the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani. As an aside, the United States designated Hekmatyar as a ‘Specially Designated Global International Terrorist’ in 2003.

After the Taliban’s rise, Dostum allied himself with Burhanuddin Rabbani, whom he had, as mentioned in the last paragraph, fought several years earlier. But he also attempted to play the other side of the fence, sending aircraft technicians to help restore MIG-21’s captured by the Taliban. When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, leading to the retreat of Northern Alliance forces, Dostum found himself in the midst of a power struggle within his own faction. General Abdul Malik Pahlawan, then a subordinate of Dostun, accused him of being complicit in the murder of his brother. In an attempt to have Dostum permanently removed from power, the general entered into an agreement with the Taliban in which he would deliver them Northern Alliance commander Ismail Khan and allow them to enter Mazar-i-Sharif, effectively gifting them control over most of Northern Afghanistan. Of course, at the time Malik was under the assumption that his forces would retain control of the region as a proxy force. While Dostum was forced to flee to Turkey, Malik soon learned that the Taliban had no intention of keeping their promises, ordering that his men be disarmed. This led to Malik’s decision to turn on his new allies, and with the help of Northern Alliance forces drove them out of Mazar-i-Sharif in late 1997. Following the Taliban’s defeat, Dostum returned from exile and proceeded to drive Malik out of Mazar-i-Sharif, which he controlled for a short period before, once again, being forced to flee back to Turkey.

I don’t know if you’re still with me at this point or if you’re pounding your head against a wall – but there’s more.

In 2001, funded by his one time ally/enemy Ahmad Shah Massoud, Dostun returned to Afghanistan to assist the Northern Alliance in an operation to open a new front against the Taliban. Dostum would become one of three primary leaders of the Northern Alliance, along with General Mohammed Fahim and Ismail Khan.

Dasht-i-Leili

As mentioned earlier, the CIA mistrusted Dostun, but given the ever growing atmosphere of politicization at Langley, those within the agency that probably warned against utilizing Dostun were most likely ignored. In the end, CIA paramilitary officer John Micheal Spann (Directorate of Operations) arrived in the Dariya Suf to secure communications followed a day later by a two-dozen members of Operational Detachment Alpha. This incursion, while small, effectively began the invasion. Dostun’s forces would combine with US Special Forces to attack Kunduz, which they took in late November. The desertion rate following the operation was considerable, leading to most surrendering their arms outside of Mazar-i-Sharif. Those taken prisoner were to be transferred to Sheberghan prison.

The prisoners were loaded into large, sealed metal truck containers to be transported. During the crossing of the Dasht-e-Leili desert many of them suffocated to death. When those traveling with the convoy discovered what was occurring, the sides of the containers were sprayed with small arms fire, the purpose being to provide holes through which air could travel. Of course, the tactic only resulted in more deaths.

It is here that it should be pointed out that the soldiers accompanying that convoy were under Dostum’s command and were joined by members of US Special Forces.

While the massacre received some attention shortly after it happened, it was, for the most part, convoluted by the military until the story went cold and was eventually swept under the rug. That is, until a mass grave was discovered.

The preliminary findings were that a forensic excavation was required to determine the identities of the victims. Three bodies that were exhumed by a UN forensic team lead them to conclude that all three had died of suffocation. In 2008 it was discovered that the site of the grave had been tampered with and that the bodies within it were most likely removed. Local witnesses, fearing the consequences, largely refused to cooperate with investigators.

From the Associated Press, December, 2008…

“The U.N. confirmed Friday that a mass grave in northern Afghanistan has been disturbed, raising the possibility that evidence supporting allegations of a massacre seven years ago may have been removed.

The Dasht-e-Leili grave site holds as many as 2,000 bodies of Taliban prisoners who died in transit after surrendering during one of the regime’s last stands in November 2001, according to a State Department report from 2002.

McClatchy Newspapers first reported the tampering with the grave site on Thursday.”

The number of those killed remains unknown. Some place the figure at around 250 while others claim it upwards of 2,000. But one thing is for certain. No matter who was in charge of the movement of those prisoners, US military personnel were present – which means, at the very least, they stood by and did nothing. And while it is possible that some of them could have reported the incident to their superiors, none of them have come forward publicly about it.

If adequate suspicion is what you require, take the following into consideration. The International Red Cross has been calling for an investigation since 2001 and has been rebuffed by NATO for eight years. Added to that, the Bush Administration repeatedly discouraged any official probe into the massacre. It is only now, eight years after the fact, that the Obama Administration has finally decided to investigate what occurred. Unfortunately, given the time that’s passed, the chances of that probe producing actionable results are slim to none.

July 16, 2009

United Nations human rights investigators have submitted a report to the UNHRC regarding Israel’s Gaza offensive in which one of its authours, Richard Falk, argues that one of the primary requirements to determine if the action was illegal is whether the IDF could differentiate between civilian and military targets. Falk states in the report that if the IDF was unable to then the invasion of Gaza was unlawful and would constitute a war crime under international law.

Falk’s assertion is not unfounded. As he points out, the ratio of deaths is massively suggestive of Israeli misconduct regarding the civilian population, with 1,434 Palestinians losing their lives compared to just 13 Israelis. He also asserted that the Israeli blockade of Gaza is in violation of the Geneva Conventions.

Ultimately, and as Falk has suggested, an independent inquiry into possible war crimes committed by both Hamas and Israel should be undertaken.

March 24, 2009 7 Comments

You can call it something else, but until you actual alter the mechanism then it’s nothing more than a PR move…

“The US government today revised the standard by which it claims authority to hold Guantánamo Bay detainees and said today it would drop use of the term “enemy combatant”, which critics say George Bush’s administration devised in order to hold prisoners outside traditional legal frameworks.

According to a filing in federal court today, the US justice department will only seek to detain individuals who provided “substantial” support for al-Qaida or the Taliban. It also acknowledges that president Barack Obama’s authority to hold detainees is granted by an act of Congress and by international laws of war, rather than stemming from his power as commander in chief of the military.

“As we work towards developing a new policy to govern detainees, it is essential that we operate in a manner that strengthens our national security, is consistent with our values, and is governed by law,” attorney general Eric Holder said in a statement. “The change we’ve made today meets each of those standards and will make our nation stronger.”

Take note of that – “…governed by law.”

As Tom Malinowski, the Washington director of Human Rights Watch, put it…

“It’s a symbolic effort to distance the new administration from the Bush approach,” he said. “But they’ve preserved significant aspects of the previous administration’s detention authority.”

But probably the best response came from Jen Nessel, a spokeswoman for the Centre for Constitutional Rights…

“Old wine in new bottles.”

You can refrain from using the term ‘enemy combatant’ but that does not mean that the rights afforded prisoners under international laws and conventions are going to be applied. Those being held at Bagram are not suddenly going to be visited by representatives of the International Red Cross who should be provided free access to them. Nor does it mean that the tenets of the Geneva Conventions will suddenly apply, that those being held will be afforded the right to know why they are being held or have access to legal representation in many cases.

‘The law’ still has nothing to do with it.

March 14, 2009 13 Comments

Its definition is rather straight forward – an uncertain period of awaiting a decision or resolution. Welcome to the reality of some 600 inmates at the notorious US detention facility at Bagram Airbase.

To claim the facility at Bagram merely a ‘detention facility’ is to claim Abu Ghraib a rundown Holiday Inn. It was at Bagram that harsh interrogation practices first began, as vividly recounted in Alex Gibney’s ‘Taxi To The Darkside’ in which numerous military personnel stationed at the base relay their experiences. It was the way station at which detainees were held prior to their transfer to Guantanamo, and the location at which methods used in an attempt to gain ‘actionable intelligence’ were first employed by everyone from untrained military intelligence personnel to the CIA. It was, in short, ground zero for the abandonment of American observance of the rule of law and the Geneva Conventions.

And now the Justice Department, a body in a country half a world away, has ruled that those being detained at the facility have no constitutional rights. The truth is, they have no rights whatsoever…

“The US justice department argues that Bagram differs from Guantanamo Bay because it is in an overseas war zone and prisoners there are being held as part of ongoing military action.”

Fine, it’s a facility in an overseas war zone. If that’s the case then every individual being held has rights under the Geneva Conventions. If they don’t, then it is either not a war zone or the United States is in breach of international law…

“Prof Olshansky said the conditions at the Bagram facility, which is near the Afghan capital, Kabul, were worse than those at Guantanamo Bay, adding that there was a lack of due process available to detainees.

“The situation in Bagram is so far from anything like meeting the laws of war or the human rights treaties that we’re bound to,” she told the BBC.

“There are no military hearings where the detainees can present evidence,” she added. “Torture has led to homicides there that have been admitted by the US.”

“It’s quite a severe situation, and yet the US is planning a $60m new prison to hold 1,100 more people there.”

The US military considers Bagram detainees unlawful combatants who can be detained for as long as they are deemed a threat to Afghan national security.”

Detention without any recourse. It would seem that Afghanistan is not a ‘new found democracy’ after all if it lacks the ability to provide those being detained rights under its own laws. That speaks more to the reality of Afghanistan than anything – that it is not a functioning democracy, that its government is nothing more than a PR regime, and that it is, in truth, nothing more than a de facto American police state.

There are those that argue that the detainees being held at Bagram deserve no rights under international conventions and treaties because they themselves do not observe them. My mother once asked me when I was a child if I would jump off a bridge were everyone else to. It would seem that America’s answer to that question would be yes.

February 20, 2009 6 Comments