When you are the most powerful nation in the world you risk nothing by sitting down and talking with those you consider enemies. Any fool can claim that preconditions have to be met before dialogue can happen, but without dialogue nothing changes without the use of force, and even then change is never assured nor lasting, as has been demonstrated very clearly over the last seven years.
It takes a bigger man to talk than to pull a trigger or order others to do it for them. It takes an individual with vision, determination, and moral fortitude to exhaust every option available before sending young people to their deaths. It is a quality that President Bush completely lacks, as does Vice President Dick Cheney and others, past and present, in the current administration. The foreign policy doctrine adopted after 9/11 erased diplomacy from the American political dictionary, replacing it with unilateralism and preemption. Subsequently, more Americans have died in Iraq than did on September 11th, with tens of thousands more wounded. The real tragedy, of course, is that that is nothing compared to what the people of Iraq have had to endure.
When it comes to the invasion of Iraq, diplomacy was not something that the Bush Administration was ever interested in. In truth, the possibility of sitting down with their once notorious ally was never an option. A permanent military footprint in the region cemented through regime change was the goal of the invasion, rendering diplomacy laughable. It would have been as fruitful for the Iraqis as Chamberlain’s negotiations with Hitler. Despite those negotiations, the German inner circle had already decided on a course of action that no amount of diplomacy was going to alter. And yet, that very same historic example was applied in reverse with regards to the regime of Saddam Hussein – that diplomacy was pointless, even though the Bush Administration set about engineering the appearance that it was attempting to exhaust diplomatic options. What is commonly overlooked though is that those options were direct threats that, if not adhered to, would result in military action that was wholly premeditated. Compounded by the entirely false link between the regime of Hussein and 9/11 spread by the Bush Administration, there was nothing that Iraq could have done to avoid a US invasion. Even if Hussein, his sons, and his closest confidants had either left the country or given themselves up, the United States military still would have ventured onto Iraqi soil, still would have played the leading role in the creation of a new government, and their presence would have still led to the unforeseen uprising that no one at the Pentagon thought a seriously damaging proposition.
During the run up to the invasion the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission under Hans Blix attempted to make headway, but even they were bullied to the point of having to acquiesce to the premeditated determination of the Bush Administration, which also included dealing with British Intelligence’s Rockingham operation.
Over the last seven years we have had front row seats at a show that has demonstrated the ineffectiveness of both threats and force. When Afghanistan was initially invaded how many people would have believed that seven years later negotiations with the Taliban would be seen as a option? How many people have truly paid attention to NATO’s expansion in Eastern Europe and seriously considered the ramifications? How many people still labour under the misconception that Iraq is a war that must be won to save face, as all other considerations have been rendered practically implausible? The Iraqi government doesn’t want foreign forces in the country, the majority of Iraqis, no matter their affiliations, don’t want foreign forces in the country, and yet foreign forces, primarily American forces, remain. So what is it about the American psyche that refuses to face reality? If anything it’s rooted in those occurrences in which diplomacy was not attempted prior to military action.
This is certainly not new territory for the United States. During the Vietnam war US forces fought for three years before Hanoi and Washington began dialoguing. It wouldn’t be until 1973 that any definitive agreement was reached, and not until 1975 until US personnel completely left the country. During the majority of that conflict many Americans considered it unfathomable that anything other than complete victory would be the outcome. After yet, after ten years and the deaths of just over 58,000 men, the North Vietnamese prevailed. Not surprisingly, given the outcome of the war, the Vietnam War Memorial that stands in Constitution Gardens was wholly funded by private donations.
Like Iraq, the Vietnam war was one that was a premeditated inevitability. After the assassination of President Kennedy, and the reversal of his decision to begin reducing the number of US military advisors in South Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs finally got what they wanted. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, real or not, provided the pretext that various individuals within the military establishment had been seeking since Kennedy’s last minute decision not to directly support the invasion of Cuba, a covert operation that his administration inherited when he took office – a reason to go to war. Communism was the threat with which they justified it, driven by belief in the Domino Theory which, with regards to South East Asia, was hollow given that the North Vietnamese struggle was nationalist in nature and that the Sino-Soviet split demolished the reality of a global Communist umbrella.
So what would the United States lose by sitting down with anyone from the Iranians to Hamas? Absolutely nothing. In fact, doing so would open vital lines of communication that could work towards solutions rather than impede them. Unfortunately, when preconditions are put into place, the willingness of others to enter into such relationships is severely impeded.
The moral high ground is not something that the United States can claim that it holds, despite the beliefs of those such as John McCain. Ironically, McCain’s imprisonment in Vietnam came to an end because of diplomacy, not because of the successful use of military force or diplomacy with precondition. Thus, to claim that preconditions must be met before diplomacy can occur only deters the possibility of its success.
During stump speeches, Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin has exhaustively repeated that John McCain knows how to win wars. I find such an assertion utterly ignorant being that the United States lost the only war that McCain was ever involved in and that for most of it he was a prisoner of war. How that makes McCain qualified with regards to achieving military successes is quite beyond me, though it does explain his reluctance to sit down with the leaders of countries, such as Iran, without preconditions being met.
Ultimately, diplomacy at gunpoint is not diplomacy, it’s geopolitical extortion. If ever there was an example of the detriment of the lack of diplomatic access, look no further than the Cuban Missile Crisis. While it has since been wholly mythologized as an American political victory over the Soviet Union, the reality is that the roots of the crisis began with US covert actions against Cuba and support for its invasion. After Kennedy refused to allow US forces to directly support the failed invasion, which was undertaken by Cuban exiles, the government of Fidel Castro turned to the Soviet Union to help ensure that his government possessed a deterrent against the possibility of another invasion, perhaps one wholly undertaken by US forces. And so the USSR placed MRBM’s in Cuba, which were ultimately detected by US U2 surveillance, leading to a series of events that brought the world to the brink of global nuclear war.
The Kennedy brothers were smart enough to realize that had US forces openly assisted in the failed invasion of Cuba that the Soviets would have reacted elsewhere. As I mentioned earlier, the invasion of Cuba, or Operation Zapata, was inherited by the Kennedy administration and sold to them as one in which only Cuban exiles would participate. When things went bad, and the President was faced with the decision of providing air cover for the invading force, he refused. The disaster that resulted is well known, but it also led to the dismissal of prominent, and powerful, US political and military figures, among them CIA Director Allen Dulles, who Kennedy would later claim lied to him about aspects of the operation. That said, Kennedy was guilty of green-lighting Operation Mongoose after the failed invasion, a part of the CIA’s Cuban Project which was a wide ranging aggressive covert operation that’s stated purpose was to help Cubans overthrow the Communist regime. Another operation included in the Cuban Project, which was not adopted, was drafted by the Joint Chiefs and signed by then Chairman General Lyman Lemnitzer. Codenamed Northwoods, it was a false flag operation that outlined the use of CIA and other operatives to kill innocents and commit acts of terrorism within the United States to create public support for an invasion of Cuba.
The Cuban Missile Crisis was a direct result of the failed invasion of Cuba. Rather than attempting to open lines of communication between Washington and Havana, the United States, under two Presidents, opted to isolate it, placing Castro’s government in the position of having to acquire a deterrent to ensure its survival. Being that Cuba is only 90 miles off the coast of Florida, and that US naval and air stations are within 100 miles of Cuban soil, Castro’s decision to turn to the Soviets for help was a forgone conclusion. Thus, the lack of concerted diplomatic efforts from the time that revolutionary forces in Cuba seized power up until the failed invasion played a significant role in what would ultimately result in the most dangerous two weeks the world has ever known.
Had the White House had open lines of communication with Moscow following the detection of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the crisis might never have escalated to the point that it did. But because both the Soviets and the Americans were operating largely in the dark, the situation was one that played out in a slow and dangerous fashion. While the United Nations was used as the pulpit from which both nations preached, it was largely guesswork and the Kennedy Administration’s decision to rely on the contents of the first of two missives sent via teletype from Premier Khrushchev. In that first missive, which may have been the result of backchannel communications between Washington and Moscow brought about by ABC’s John Scali’s relationship with Aleksandr Fomin, the Soviets top spy in the US and a long time friend of Khrushchev, it was evident that Khrushchev understood the gravity of the situation and that a diplomatic solution was required to defuse it. In the end, in exchange for the removal of the missiles from Cuba the United States pledged to remove its missiles along the Turkish-Soviet border within 6 months, a compromise that left both governments in the position of claiming that success had been achieved.
So the question has to be asked, especially given the fact that during that two week period the Joint Chiefs were breathing down Kennedy’s neck to launch air strikes to destroy the missiles and follow them up with a full scale invasion of Cuba, which would have only resulted in the Soviets acting elsewhere and producing a direct conflict between the two super powers – what other course of action was realistically available other than diplomacy and concessions on the part of both the US and the Soviets?
The answer is – none. Because had diplomacy failed, chances are that I would not be sitting here writing this.
Compared to the threat that the West believes that Iran currently poses, the Soviets were in a class far beyond anything the Iranians could ever dream of. And yet diplomacy was the method used to defuse a situation in which this world came the closest it ever has to nuclear war.
In the end, diplomacy is not the art of the weak. In truth, it is the art of hope and progress. And while it may be said that diplomacy is far more affective when your position is backed by significant military force, the truth is that, in most situations, honesty gets you a lot further than threats, and the willingness to talk gets you a lot farther than the willingness to fight. Unless, that is, those that you are talking with have already made up their mind that death and destruction is their goal. But even in such cases, what decent human being can say that by not trying to be civilized before civility is abandoned isn’t what makes us civilized in the first place?