The Olympics are in full swing here in town and a skier from Quebec has just become the first Canadian to win a Gold medal on Canadian soil. That’s the toast of the nation this morning.

Team Canada is also competing elsewhere today – in the NATO offensive against the Afghan insurgent stronghold of Marjah, where a rocket strike killed 5 children yesterday. The leaflets dropped prior to the assault warned those civilians left in the town of 80,000 to remain indoors, which is where the children were with their family when the end came.

The ugly truth is that were it to have occurred sixty-five years ago the deaths of 5 children wouldn’t have even been reported. The fire bombing of Tokyo, then the most densely populated industrial city in the world, would result in the deaths of an estimated 100,000 civilians, though many historians argue that ‘official’ figure too low. Given that the city had an average of 103,000 to 135,000 residents per square mile at the time, and 15.8 square miles of the city were destroyed that night, with a firestorm literally blocking any possible escape from the ensuing inferno, 1.5 million people would have been caught in the area. Thus, how more than a tenth of them survived is, I believe, the result of creative mathematics.

Operation Moshtarak is being hailed as a success thus far, with IED’s and small pockets of resistance representing the only obstacles to the force of 15,000 that entered the area at dawn two days ago. But as I’ve stated repeatedly of late, the probability that the majority of insurgents slipped out of the area prior to the assault remains likely. After all, they were warned in advance.

According to NATO, as of today no significant insurgent movements have occurred, leading commanders to state that the enemy has been contained.

Of course, the real focus of the operation was never the military assault, rather, whether successfully winning control of the caustic Province can establish a successful PR bridgehead and lead to the growth of positive public sentiment regarding both the Afghan federal government and those occupational forces fighting to maintain its existence.

February 15, 2010

Been busy, which is to say that I’ve had a piano and a guitar strapped to my back. Been scoring a lot of brass as well, which has been an enjoyable challenge.

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Organized on social networking sites, there was a massive snowball fight that attracted hundreds in Washington DC yesterday to Dupont Circle where residents of the city’s North and South sides squared off. Maybe Congress should start using Twitter more, they might actually get something accomplished.

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In Afghanistan, insurgent leaders have rejected the Afghan government’s latest offer of reconciliatory talks, most likely due to the fact that occupational forces are about to embark on the largest operation of the war – the assault on Marjah in Helmand (Operation Moshtarak). Home to some 80,000 people, Marjah has quickly turned into a ghost town as word of the impending attack has spread. Thousands of civilians have fled the area, though I doubt that they were alone in doing so. Attempting to repel a conventional assault on what NATO views as the insurgency’s last remaining stronghold in Helmand, the dictates of guerrilla warfare are quite clear – let them have it and vanish, be it across the border into Pakistan or into the throngs of civilians fleeing the area. Insurgents stand to gain nothing by defending the position, and being that there are most likely those among them with experience regarding the confrontation of conventionally superior forces, they would know that attempting to do so is pointless. Better to melt into the populace or the mountains while a counter-operation is launched against targets in the capital after the attack begins to remind NATO that the rules of the game haven’t changed. If a significant number of insurgents remain in Marjah and attempt to defend it I’ll be considerably surprised, as to do so would be counter to one of the fundamental pillars of modern guerrilla warfare – never fight an enemy head on. While some might claim that insurgents need to retain control of the town given its importance as an opium hub, and therefore a necessary element with regards to their financial sustainability, the truth of the matter is that manpower, not the protection of what is assuredly a lost cause, is of greater importance. True, a token few will remain and willingly give their lives, but only for the purpose of perception. The truth remains, while Operation Moshtarak might be a military success as far as NATO is concerned, and lauded over by the Western media, insurgents retain the ability to launch attacks at will against targets in the capital itself. And if they can drive a vehicle filled with explosives to within yards of NATO headquarters, as they have already done, then they can get to other symbolic targets of opportunity. As long as they have the ability to do so, time is on their side.

February 7, 2010

On July 2nd, in the largest airborne assault since Vietnam, 4,500 US Marines were landed in Helmand Province. Their mission was to relieve a much smaller embattled British contingent and begin the largest offensive in the eight-year war. There are now in excess of 10,000 Marines in Helmand Province, their sights fixed on the insurgent redoubt at Marja, a warren of irrigation canals on the outskirts of Lashkar Gah that US commanders believe represents the last insurgent foothold in the Province. If the insurgents face the Marines at Marja, goes the common line, their presence in Helmand will be decidedly diminished.

The US strategy in Helmand, which has been viewed as a conventional success thus far, is steeped in familiar methodology – capture, hold, advance. While it has seemingly worked, it is important to remember that the outright control of towns and villages has never been a quintessential requirement of any insurgency. In fact, the most intelligent response to US operations would be to disappear, literally handing the US control of population centers and even considerable portions of the countryside.

Resource

One of the prominent goals of the Helmand campaign is to seize and destroy opium crops that are viewed as the insurgency’s primary financial resource. While it is true that revenues from opium have been used to support the insurgency over the last eight years, ever diversifying streams of support have since risen to prominence, among them financial transfers from Gulf States and parts of Europe. It is even thought that kickbacks from USAID contracts are being funneled to the insurgency. Given the billions of dollars in contracts handed out to private firms that then subcontract the work out to locals, the possibility of some of those funds finding their way into the insurgency’s hands isn’t out of the question either.

Realignments In Strategy

Time. The insurgency has all the time in the world. Coalition forces, on the other hand, are under enormous pressure to produce results. That being the case, one of the best realignments in insurgent strategy would be to disengage from various operations and shift focus. All that is required is the ability to launch sporadic operations that remind the populace that the insurgency is still a viable entity that’s primary purpose, even if limited, is resisting foreign occupiers and the corrupt government that they have helped insititute.

A demonstration of that very strategy was evident in Kabul today, where insurgents attacked the Justice, Education and Finance Ministries, and engaged local security forces in a gun-battle in the city’s center. While it is believed that only twenty insurgents took part in the operation, the fact that they still have the ability to strike targets in the capital sends a very clear message to US commanders in Helmand – we can move the show to the other side of the country and only need twenty men to produce results.

To put it in extremely simple terms – have you ever attempted to catch a chicken by chasing it around a barnyard that isn’t enclosed? If you have, how’d that work out for you?

January 18, 2010

There was a time when Hamid Karzai was hailed as courageous, a symbol of democratic possibility in a nation that has never had a successful centralized government. He’s played the role well. When he needs to placate the West he has. When he’s needed to condemn the West in an attempt to win domestic favour he has. Mind you, the latter was most likely the West’s idea.

Today, Karzai claimed that he needn’t be on good terms with those occupying his country, nor enjoy their favour, to share a common purpose with them. Of course, without their favour, Karzai would either be dead or in exile right now, so to claim that he doesn’t require it is a little much. Then again, that’s to be expected from a man who stole an election and received a light slap on the wrist for it before the whole matter was, rather amazingly, forgotten in an expediently convenient fashion.

Behind closed doors we’re led to believe that the United States is growing tired of Karzai and his mouth. In my opinion, the majority of what comes out of Karzai’s mouth is put there by the United States, even statements in which he claims that he doesn’t require their ‘favour’.

It’s at this point that some might claim that I am being far too imaginative. To that I would answer that prior to the last national election there was speculation that the US was unhappy with Karzai. Unfortunately, following it, they recognized him as the legitimate head of state besides the fact that they knew all too well that the election wasn’t merely fraudulent, but bought and paid for. At that crucial juncture the United States made a decision – to stay with the devil they created rather than use the fraudulence of the election as a means to remove him. To have attempted the latter would have, in the view of many, only increased the insurgency’s resolve. The truth, of course, is that Karzai or no, the insurgency’s resolve wasn’t going to be diminished or increased because of the outcome of the election. Beyond that, there are other factors to take into consideration, the most important being the continued placation of various factions that were promised post-invasion assurances before Karzai was placed on his paper thrown. The United States was in bed with them prior to the invasion, had to placate them after it, and continue to do so. In fact, a segment of the current government of the country, not to mention its military leadership, is rife with those most likely reaping the benefits of deals cut with the likes of the CIA prior to the invasion for their cooperation during it.

That said, the resolve of the insurgency is buoyed by the presence of occupational forces and will only increase the longer occupational forces remain in the country. Added to that, turbulence on the other side of the border is only deepening their commitment. In the end, it doesn’t much matter who is President, the insurgency will still view them as a puppet of the West given that the process by which they secured the position was introduced and promoted by foreign powers and therefore suspect. Further to that, ignoring Karzai’s utterly corrupted reacquisition of the Presidency has only hurt NATO, allowing the insurgency to very rightly point out that the façade of Afghan democracy is, in fact, nothing more than that – a façade. In short, the West has proved itself hypocritical, and if anything has aided the resolve of the insurgency, it’s that.

In my opinion, Mr. Karzai is nothing more than a conduit through which to gauge public disposition. The existence of his government ensures that the insurgency remains actively engaged, ultimately legitimizing the presence of foreign forces.

January 9, 2010

Hamid Karzai is a man that more people should educate themselves about. We are, after all, talking about an individual that, after turning down the Taliban’s offer of becoming their Ambassador to the United Nations, went into exile in Pakistan where he worked to have Afghanistan’s Shah reinstated. In short, the man that became the face of Afghan democracy spent his time lobbying for the return of a monarch before becoming the West’s post invasion go-to guy.

Eight years later, he now finds himself exchanging heated words with Richard Holbrooke, one of numerous foreign and domestic representatives and leaders displeased with the massively fraudulent nature of the recent elections…

“Facing the prospect of several more weeks of counting the dubious results of August’s presidential election, Afghan tribal elders met today in the city of Kabul to demand that President Hamid Karzai resign so that an interim government could be installed to hold clean elections.

Karzai’s presumptive landslide victory comes amid thousands of reports of widespread voter fraud and intimidation by Karzai loyalists. His chief opponent, Abdullah Abdullah, has ruled out joining any sort of unity government, though he did urge a “calm” reaction to the results.

On the day of the election reports were already emerging that extra voting cards could be bought on the open market for as little as $8, and that the “indelible” ink provided turned out to be easily washed off. That was nothing compared to what was to come.

The election commission reported last week that they now had around 700 complaints which were considered “category A,” meaning any one of them is large enough to have swayed the outcome. Media reports also suggest that thousands of the claimed voters in some districts may not have showed up at all.”

To be honest, Mr. Holbrooke doesn’t have a leg to stand on. The United States placed their weight firmly behind Karzai after the invasion and they’re simply reaping what they’ve sown. It’s not as if US puppets haven’t come to life in the past and decided to take matters into their own hands given the opportunity to do so, making Karzai simply one more example of dubious American judgment.

Every day it’s something new. The war is being refocused, past mistakes are being corrected, more troops are required, a new strategy needs to be embraced…

“As the page closed on August, the deadliest month yet for US soldiers in Afghanistan, top US commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal admitted that the current strategy, which was itself a new strategy presented only five months ago to replace the previous new strategy, isn’t working at that yet another new strategy is needed.”

McChrystal claims that success is still achievable, though concedes that it will take some time. Given that US forces have been occupying the country for the last eight years, how much time is “more time”, and how many more months ahead will become the new “deadliest month” for troops in Afghanistan?

The Taliban is currently operating at pre-9/11 strength. Of course, it’s now a misconception to claim the Taliban a single entity. In truth, it’s become one that is bolstered by numerous other anti-occupational groups, making the sum total a far more complex creature to deal with. Like “al-Qaede in Iraq”, the term “Taliban” has become a media buzz word. Thanks to the occupation, the reality is that those that oppose the occupation are not limited to membership within a single group, nor do they all subscribe to the same ideologies. Of course, that doesn’t matter given that they all do agree on one thing – that occupational forces must be confronted, an area in which they have significant experience.

That fact brings up a rather disturbing parallel, as The Guardian’s Jonathan Steele explains…

“It is deja vu on a huge and bloody scale. General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, is about to advise his president that “the Afghan people are undergoing a crisis of confidence because the war against the Taliban has not made their lives better”, according to leaked reports. Change the word “Taliban” to “mujahideen”, and you have an exact repetition of what the Russians found a quarter of a century ago.

Like Nato today, the Kremlin realised its forces had little control outside the main cities. The parallels don’t end there. The Russians called their Afghan enemies dukhy (ghosts), ever-present but invisible, as hidden in death as they were when alive – which echoes Sean Smith’s recent photographic account of the fighting in Helmand and the failure of the British units he was with to find a single Talib body.”

This thing is going to get uglier. The price of our stupidity will, once again, be paid for by those that do not form policy but simply enact it. Some 130 Canadians have lost their lives doing just that. Maybe it’s time Mr. Harper’s entire cabinet was dropped into Kandahar to fight so that they can experience first hand the conditions into which they have been sending Canadian forces. Mind you, our current government shouldn’t go alone. We should dredge up the last one that agreed to partake in this pointless exercise to go with them.

Come to think of it, let’s send most of Parliament. I’d give them all four or five days at most. After that we could hold new elections with the knowledge that those running for office are terrified of having the same thing done to them and might actually think before sending their countrymen to jump off proverbial cliffs.

September 1, 2009