I first read Joseph Conrad’s novella, Heart Of Darkness, when I was fifteen - being that it was the premise for one of my favourite films, Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now. I would revisit it again in my late 20’s after reading an article in which Conrad’s time spent as the captain of a steamer in the Congo was highlighted. For those of you that haven’t read it, I would recommend that you do for numerous reasons, the foremost being Conrad’s commentary on the human condition with regards to the depths and limitations of human psychological endurance and corruption.
There is, of course, dark colonial aspects to the piece that are also of import, but being the son of a man that was born in colonial India, and whose family lived there for over a century, the realities of that mindset are nothing new to me. I was, even at a young age, aware of the sort of racism and arrogance found in the colonial mindset, and brutally exposed to it when one of my great uncles would visit from South Africa.
That said, my mention of Conrad’s story is in response to Kurt Langmann’s recent editorial in the Abbotsford News in which my position on Afghanistan is questioned and he suggests that I read Heart Of Darkness.
The article is somewhat geopolitically narrow, as it wanders through an ambiguous argument that relies on a variety of contextual dissimilarities while attempting to unify them by pointing to the inevitability of violent outcomes. Our role in Afghanistan turns to UN involvement in Africa as a measure with which to address the ineffectuality of UN peacekeeping operations, attempting to abridge the two. In doing so, Langmann offers up numerous examples of the inability of the United Nations to effectively address past and ongoing conflicts in Africa while using my mention of the need for a more astute UN mandate in Afghanistan as pretext.
First, let me say that my mention of a clearly defined and commanded UN mission in Afghanistan is one steeped in the need for any such force to be complimented by personnel from states within the region itself, as I have mentioned on this website before. But, of course, that alone would not detract from the reality that UN forces would face the same sort of dangers that NATO troops now face.
The rules of engagement with regards to UN forces are, obviously, different than that of regular conventional forces. In the simplest of terms, they are only permitted to return fire when fired upon, or when the lives of those under their protection are threatened. That said, they are not traditionally meant to be aggressive in nature, merely a presence to deter violence in hopes of providing stability. But that is not to say that they do not represent a military force themselves. As anyone with an understanding of UN peacekeeping is aware, when soldiers under the UN flag are included in an operation, they are equipped to deal with military occurrences. Counter-insurgency, on the other hand, is not something that falls within their mandate.
That said, and as I have written previously, the rubber stamp provided by the UN with regards to operations in Afghanistan was simply procedural, lending credence to the actions of those that invaded the country in response to 9/11. Like the Bush administration’s refusal to join the ICC, or its disregard of the 53rd Article of the UN Charter with regards to the illegal invasion of Iraq, the United States and other permanent Security Council members have always used the UN as a plus-minus apparatus with regards to their own objectives. It should never be overlooked that the Council’s five permanent members constitute the world’s five most prolific arms dealers, and that theirs is one of the most hypocritical positions with regards to passing judgment on the use of truly effective interventionism in locales where they do business or have a vested interest in a particular outcome.
Langmann points to Sudan as an example of how a UN mandated force would not change the bloody outcome of what continues to transpire there. And while the AU has recently committed 26,000 peacekeepers to help further deal with the situation, an undertaking that has been criticized by the UN due to the lack of training received by those being deployed and the inability of the AU to effectively impact the situation in the past, one has to examine the undertones of what has transpired there with regards to the Security Council itself and the unwillingness to directly confront Khartoum with regards to the allowance of UN forces in the country.
At the height of the genocide in Darfur, the Chinese were able to block numerous initiatives because of their economic dealings with Khartoum. For over a decade the Chinese have sold the Sudanese a considerable amount of arms, and are also the foremost exporter of Sudanese oil. Unfortunately, it doesn’t end with the Chinese. The United States, which has actually classified what is transpiring in Darfur as genocide, recently enlisted the help of the Sudanese government in recruiting operatives to use as moles to infiltrate Salafi Jihadi groups in Iraq. That would be the very same government that has been guilty of supporting the Janjiweed militias who have been largely responsible for the murder of countless innocents and the displacement of millions.
The reason why the UN is ineffectual when it comes to peacekeeping is, ironically, the body within it that conducts the oversight of security. And within that reality, the policies and objectives of those that hold permanent seats surpass the realistic needs of those that require that very body to act on their behalf. If ever there was an example of the complete and utter failure of the Security Council as measured against the priorities of some of its foremost members, it would be UNAMIR. While the world was glued to the conflict raging in the Balkans, Roméo Dallaire was being sold down the river, forced to watch a genocide of immense proportions occur in front of his eyes while being denied support from the very body that sanctioned the mission to help stop it.
The truth? The Security Council had no vested interest in Rwanda. The French were known supporters of the Hutus and the rotating seat on the Council at the time was actually filled by the Rwandan government responsible for backing the Interahamwe. The United States, worried that there would be a repeat of events in Somalia the year before, vetoed Dallaire’s request that a mere 4,000 troops and reasonable logistical support would significantly deter the situation. And thus, over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus were massacred in 100 days.
Langmann writes in his article…
“A couple of years ago my little brother, Mark, was dispatched to central Africa. His mission? To repair the bullet-riddled bodies of UN “peacekeeping” helicopters, operated by blue-helmeted UN forces that were trying to enforce the ceasefire imposed on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). And not only were the “insurgents” firing on “peacekeepers,” the latter were shooting back. That’s right, peacekeepers have guns and they use them.”
Langmann’s statement is a given, of course, and should come as absolutely no surprise to anyone. UN forces have been attacked in a variety of locales over the decades and, given their mandate, return fire when fired upon if ordered to do so. To suggest that people don’t understand that is somewhat naïve. In the case of insurgents firing on them, that too is to be expected, that’s simply a reality of peacekeeping.
Unlike the UN response to the conflict in the Balkans in the 90’s, UN forces in the DRC have not been favoured with the sort of considerable backing that those in the Balkans were. For example, MONUC, The Mission of the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, has seen extremely minimal support from most of the permanent member states of the Security Council. The UK? Seven observers. France? Three troops and three observers. In fact, the only permanent member of the Security Council to actual devote a significant number of ground forces to the operation has been China, with 218 troops and 13 observers. The majority of the contingent, with regards to troops being on the ground, come from, of all places, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Uruguay.
It’s here that the question has to be asked – why? And the answer is quite straight forward – the bottom line. In the 90’s the United States helped directly build the arsenals of eight of the nine nations involved in the Congo conflict. Since the passing of a UN resolution banning arms sales to those involved, it has since stopped, or at least gone dark, but the fact remains that business is business and proper intervention cannot take place, or be supported, where it might possibly threaten business. With regards to Darfur, the same is true with regards to China’s position, as well as past US involvement in financing and arming The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and their current need to placate Khartoum, despite their past support for the SPLA, given their recent overtures regarding covert intelligence operations in Iraq.
So what is the point of using the United Nations as a mechanism with regards to foreign intervention? That’s a very good question, but one that cannot be dismissed because of the stranglehold that the permanent members of the Security Council enjoy. If we are to abandon the existence of an international organization created to safeguard the welfare of nations and those who inhabit them, not to mention a basis for the safeguarding of international law, then the only option left us is to completely accept the bilateral and unilateral actions of the world’s foremost powers as both inevitable and justified simply because of their military might. Thus, it is up to nations such as Canada to demand that our inclusion in foreign military interventions be tempered by not only the tenets of an organization that exists to represent the equality of global security, but the compliance of those in a position to dismiss it to act according to its purpose for the sake of creating a just, respected, and professional force that will be taken seriously whenever it is deployed.